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No single body of law presently governs a corporation's obli-
gations to creditors. However, disparate laws, starting from dif-
ferent perspectives, contribute to a patchwork of obligations that
is poorly understood. Consequently, corporate directors have lit-
tle guidance when balancing creditor and shareholder rights
under corporate restructurings, securitizations, and leveraged
transactions.
Commentators who have grappled with this issue focus al-
most exclusively on the fiduciary duty of a corporation's board of
directors to shareholders. Some argue that only shareholders
should be entitled to the duty; others argue that the duty should be
extended to creditors under various circumstances. This Article
maintains that both approaches are incomplete because they as-
sume that the standard of duty, if one exists, is fiduciary and also
because both fail to take into account other, more fundamental,
sources of the corporate obligation to creditors.
This Article instead argues that the analysis of whether a cor-
poration owes an obligation to creditors must start with the ques-
tion of whether a debtor generally has an obligation to creditors.
Only by answering that question can one analyze how the
debtor's being a corporation should affect that obligation.
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The Article uses this two-step approach to reflect on the ap-
propriate boundaries of the corporate obligation to creditors, par-
ticularly where the interests of shareholders and creditors conflict.
It shows that a debtor-corporate or not-owes a limited obliga-
tion of good faith to creditors that addresses many of the evils that
commentators advocating a broad fiduciary duty to creditors
have identified.
The Article then explores how that obligation is affected
when the debtor is a corporation. In that context, it analyzes the
"vicinity of insolvency" test proposed by Chancellor Allen in the
Credit Lyonnais case, and suggests an alternative approach that
sets a brighter line to determine when directors should have loy-
alty to both creditors and shareholders but gives more leeway and
discretion to directors when that dual loyalty arises.
Finally, the Article proposes a theory that unifies these com-
mercial law and corporate governance approaches while balanc-
ing a corporation's ability to take legitimate business risks with
the reasonable expectations of creditors that their rights will not
be impaired.
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INTRODUCTION
The question of a corporation's obligation to creditors has be-
come an urgent one in the business community as more and more
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corporations are restructuring in ways that benefit shareholders
but potentially prejudice creditors.
Traditionally viewed, a corporation's obligation, or at least
that of its directors, is solely to its shareholders. However, as cor-
porations restructure in ways that maximize shareholder return,
conflicts often arise between shareholder and creditor expecta-
tions. Marriott Corporation awakened the business community
when, several years ago, it split in two by transferring its best assets
to a newly created Marriott affiliate. Although the intention was to
increase shareholder return, Marriott's bondholders sued. Since
then, a succession of corporations, including RJR Nabisco and
AT&T, have considered or implemented similar strategies.
This tension between shareholders and creditors can be found
at the heart of a wide range of corporate and financial transactions.
In leveraged finance transactions, the increase in a corporation's
debt burden often works to the detriment of existing creditors but
to the benefit of shareholders and, sometimes, management. In a
leveraged buyout, for example, a corporation borrows money and
uses the proceeds to purchase its own outstanding shares, typically
consolidating stock ownership in the hands of a small group of
managers. The value and likelihood of repayment of the corpora-
tion's existing debt, however, is thereby impaired because of the
corporation's greatly increased leverage (ratio of debt to equity).1
The same conflict can arise in structured finance and asset
securitization transactions, where a corporation raises financing on
favorable terms by selling financial assets to a newly created sub-
sidiary. Investors extend financing to this subsidiary believing that
it is "bankruptcy remote," meaning it will not be affected by the
parent corporation's subsequent bankruptcy.2 However, if a cor-
poration's obligation is only to shareholders and not to creditors,
then the directors may well be obligated to vote to put the solvent
subsidiary of a bankrupt parent into bankruptcy in order to induce
the investors to promptly settle their claims at a discount 3 and
thereby maximize value to the parent-shareholder.4
1 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
2 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 133, 135 (1994).
3 See, e.g., In re Days Inn of Am., Inc., 161 B.R. 11 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) (where
investors of a bankrupt but solvent subsidiary settled their claims at a 5% discount in order
to receive prompt payment).
4 There are no statutory restrictions on a company's decision to file a voluntary bank-
ruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994). A pre-bankruptcy waiver by the parent-share-
holder of the right to place its subsidiary into voluntary bankruptcy, or a restriction of the
same in the subsidiary's organizational documents or by covenant, could be void under
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More generally, tension between the interests of shareholders
and creditors is inherent in every decision that increases a corpora-
tion's risk in order to make it more profitable. The celebrated case
of Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications5 recently addressed
this tension. However, many believe that its application raises as
many questions as it attempts to answer.6
Until now, commentators analyzing a corporation's obligation
to creditors have focused almost exclusively on the fiduciary duty
of the board of directors. Some argue that only shareholders
should be entitled to the duty; others argue that the duty should be
extended to creditors under various circumstances. This Article
maintains that both approaches are incomplete because they fail to
take into account other, more basic, sources of a debtor's obliga-
tion to creditors.
Rather than focusing on the fiduciary duty of a board of direc-
tors, the inquiry must start with the more fundamental question of
whether a non-corporate debtor has an obligation to creditors.
Only after answering that question can one analyze how that obli-
gation is affected when the debtor is a corporation. Using this two-
step approach, this Article analyzes the debtor-creditor relation-
ship under both commercial finance and corporate governance
principles, 7 and concludes there is no appropriate basis, absent in-
solvency, to impose traditional fiduciary standards on what is es-
sentially an arm's-length commercial relationship. 8
federal bankruptcy law. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION 17 n.26 (2d ed. 1993).
5 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. Civ. A.
12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). See infra part II.B.
6 See, e.g., Stephen R. McDonnell, Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.: Insolvency
Shifts Directors' Burden From Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J. CORP. 177, 177, 210
(1994) (stating that the language in Credit Lyonnais created ambiguities that, after Geyer,
left a "myriad of questions" unanswered). See Rima F. Hartmafi, Note, Situation-Specific
Fiduciary Duties for Corporate Directors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761, 1766 (1993) (Credit Lyonnais leaves "crucial questions
unanswered").
7 Using this two-step approach, this Article will show that a non-corporate debtor has
only limited obligations to creditors, arising under contract, fraudulent conveyance, and
commercial law. However, directors of an insolvent corporate debtor, or of a corporate
debtor whose action has a reasonable expectation of resulting in insolvency, have a dual
loyalty to creditors as well as shareholders arising from the. fact that creditors of an insol-
vent corporation replace shareholders as the residual claimants, at least until the corpora-
tion regains solvency. In balancing their dual loyalty, directors would have latitude in
weighing benefit to shareholders with harm to creditors, and would be protected by the
business judgment rule if they act in good faith.
8 See infra part I.D. This Article focuses on a corporation's obligations to creditors. It
does not examine obligations to other members of the corporate community, such as
employees.
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I. SOURCES OF LAW
No single body of law presently governs a debtor's obligation
to creditors. Disparate areas of law, discussed below, start from
different perspectives in contributing to such an obligation. How-
ever, little thought has been given in the past to how these sources
interrelate. The goal of this Article is to integrate these sources of
law (done in this part) and then to apply them to corporate debtors
(done in parts II and III).'
A. Contractual
The primary source of a debtor's obligation to creditors is con-
tract law.10 The loan agreement or other contract governing the
particular relationship between the debtor and a creditor" typi-
cally will contain covenants restricting the debtor's actions in an
attempt to ensure that it remains creditworthy. 12
9 The extent to which law should regulate the relationship between a debtor and its
creditors is actually part of the larger question of when, and how, the law should regulate
fairness in any private relationship. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Observations on the
Regulation of Fairness in Private Relationships (forthcoming 1996-97) (on file with author).
This Article observes that although all of the forms of regulating fairness in private rela-
tionships appear to be part of a continuum, there is no overall or systematic approach to
regulation under existing law. For example, nuisance law in tort developed to regulate
fairness based on actions, fiduciary obligation developed to regulate fairness based on the
nature of relationships, and good faith in commercial law developed to regulate fairness
among participants in markets. The problem is that each form of regulation has different
standards as to when regulation applies and different remedies when it does.
10 [T]he rights of the holders of the debt securities are largely a matter of contract.
There is no governing body of statutory or common law that protects the
holder of unsecured debt securities against harmful acts by the debtor except in
the most extreme situations. Short of bankruptcy, the debt securityholder can
do nothing to protect himself against actions of the borrower which jeopardize
its ability to pay the debt unless he takes a mortgage or other collateral or
establishes his rights through contractual provisions set forth in the debt agree-
ment or indenture.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING PROJECT, COMMENTARIES
ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS 2 (1971). Accord Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1049 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 1035 S. Ct.
1253 (1983); Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1061 (Del. 1986) ("The rights of
debenture holders are controlled by the terms of the indenture under which the securities
are issued.").
11 Loan agreements are sometimes called "indentures" where the lenders are investors
in the public capital markets. The promissory notes issued to evidence the loans in these
situations are called "debentures" or "bonds."
12 These covenants include restrictions on liens ("negative pledge" causes), asset sales,
debt incurrence and leverage, and change of control. Covenants enable creditors to moni-
tor the debtor and thereby limit the risk of its misbehavior, which in turn decreases the
amount of compensation that creditors will demand. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Econom-
ics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 135-36 (1989).
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Covenants in private contracts, much less public debt inden-
tures, cannot cover all future situations.13 Also, not all creditors
have the benefit of covenants. Trade creditors, for example, usu-
ally ship goods or provide services to a debtor on "open account"
terms, without signing a formal contract containing covenants. 14
Also, involuntary creditors, such as tort creditors, have no contract
with the debtor, and become creditors as a result of suffering dam-
ages from the debtor's actions. 15 It is clear, however, that the con-
tract itself does not create fiduciary obligations between the debtor
and its creditors: "Parties to a contract are not each others' fiducia-
ries; they are not bound to treat [each other] with the same consid-
eration reserved for their families."' 6
Some courts have at least raised the issue of whether implied
covenants should be inferred. 7 One must distinguish, however,
between interpreting the scope and meaning of a contract term, a
matter for contract law, and resolving an issue between parties to a
contract that simply is not governed by the contract terms. This
Article proposes that the commercial law obligation of good faith,
discussed in part I.D, governs the fairness of private commercial
relationships in the absence of contractual terms.' 8
13 See Lawrence Lessig, The Limits of Lieber, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2249, 2256-58
(1995) ("[E]very text must be imperfect .... [A]ny text will be carried into contexts
unanticipated."). Compare William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of
Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 667, 719 (arguing that, at least with respect to con-
vertible bonds, "[b]ondholder protective contract interpretation could never protect all
bondholder expectations").
14 Transactions in goods, however, are governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.
15 See Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1067, 1094 (1989).
16 Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th
Cir. 1990); accord Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("The terms
of the contractual relationship agreed to and not broad concepts such as fairness define the
corporation's obligation to bondholders."). But cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness
Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1168 n.l (1990) (arguing that
fiduciary rights should be extended to public bondholders, although admitting that "schol-
ars supporting expanded bondholder rights do not have a great deal of law supporting
them"). Compare discussion infra part I.D. (arguing that public bondholders should not
have fiduciary rights).
17 See e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
18 See Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Pro-
cess of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 938 (1995); see also infra part I.D. Cf.
Metropolitan Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1516-17; Katz, 508 A.2d at 880. But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
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B. Creditors' Rights Laws
Although creditors have various statutory rights against debt-
ors, 19 the laws intended to protect creditors against debtor actions
are very limited. The most significant is fraudulent conveyance
law, which allows a debtor's trustee in bankruptcy to avoid certain
asset transfers or obligations incurred "with actual intent to hinder,
delay or defraud" creditors.2 ° Where the debtor receives less than
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the assets transferred
or obligations incurred, fraudulent conveyance law applies even
absent actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud if the debtor was,
or became, "insolvent ' 21 after giving effect to the transfer or
obligation.22
Whenever one thinks of fraudulent conveyance law, one also
thinks of preference law,2 3 which allows a debtor's trustee in bank-
ruptcy to avoid certain asset transfers made to repay or secure
creditors within 90 days of an insolvent debtor's bankruptcy fil-
ing.24 However, preference law reflects a policy of equality of dis-
tribution, and primarily protects creditors from each other. The
debtor is no more than a stakeholder. Preference law would have
little application to the types of corporate transactions discussed in
this Article.
Another provision of law intended to protect creditors against
debtor actions is the "best interests" test under the Bankruptcy
Code,25 which ensures that a debtor reorganizing in bankruptcy
cannot force a creditor to accept a plan of reorganization without
the creditor receiving at least what it would have received in the
debtor's liquidation. Bankruptcy law sets out a formal priority
scheme in liquidation, wherein creditors' claims are paid in full
prior to shareholders receiving anything because of their equity in-
19 Article 9, Part 5, of the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, sets forth a credi-
tor's foreclosure remedies; see also infra note 29.
20 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1994). State fraudulent transfer law has parallel provisions,
and applies whether or not the debtor is in bankruptcy. See U.F.T.A. §§ 1-13, 7A U.L.A.
639-67 (1985). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact of Fraudulent Conveyance
Law on Future Advances Supported by Upstream Guaranties and Security Interests, 9 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 729 (1987).
21 Insolvency is not limited to balance sheet insolvency but includes constructive insol-
vency, including the debtor's not being able to pay its debts as they come due. See infra
text accompanying note 113; 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B) (1994).
22 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994). Fraudulent conveyance law therefore limits a corpo-
rate debtor from transferring assets to an affiliate in a corporate split, or from engaging in a
leveraged transaction, that renders the corporation insolvent or unable to pay its debts.
23 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
24 Id.
25 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1994).
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terests.26 Accordingly, shareholders of an insolvent corporation in
bankruptcy liquidation are not technically entitled to any value. 7
The best interests test only applies in a debtor's bankruptcy,
and therefore would not directly influence any of the corporate
transactions discussed in this Article. Nonetheless, because. it ef-
fectively disenfranchises shareholders of an insolvent corporation,
it reinforces the obligation 28 that an insolvent corporation has to
creditors.29
C. Fiduciary Obligation
Some have argued that debtors owe a fiduciary duty to public
bondholders, if not all creditors.3 0 They are concerned that, absent
such a duty, bondholders will be owed no duty at all. One com-
mentator has stated that, "[g]iven, then, that courts have not recog-
26 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1994).
27 The "cram down" provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1994) also prevent share-
holders from receiving any property distribution because of their shares until creditors are
paid in full. The Chapter 11 reorganization negotiating process, however, gives sharehold-
ers the practical ability to demand some value as an incentive to agree to a plan of reorgan-
ization and thereby avoid the need for a cram down. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Basics of
Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy, 68 J. CoM. BANK LENDING 36 (1985).
28 See infra part II.A.
29 Other laws protect creditors, but their impact is marginal to this Article. For exam-
ple, section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 553, allows recovery of certain setoffs
made within 90 days of an insolvent debtor's bankruptcy. Section 544, 11 U.S.C. § 544,
allows the trustee in bankruptcy to avoid transfers and obligations that could be avoided by
lien creditors and bona fide purchasers under state law. Section 552, 11 U.S.C. § 552, al-
lows the trustee in bankruptcy to avoid certain pre-bankruptcy liens on assets newly arising
in bankruptcy. These laws are all intended to enhance the debtor's estate in bankruptcy to
protect creditors generally and to increase the debtor's ability to reorganize, but it is
doubtful that they address actions that would create a conflict between shareholder and
creditor interests. Laws that protect secured creditors are not relevant to this Article be-
cause secured creditors have contracted for an interest (a security-not an ownership-
interest, but nonetheless an interest that in foreclosure may become ownership), in particu-
lar corporate assets. Further, these laws protect the property rights associated with that
interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b); U.C.C. §§ 9-207, 9-306; U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to -507 (Secured
Transactions-Default).
A legislature, of course, could choose to enact new laws to protect creditors against
debtor actions. By way of comparison, and although this Article would not recommend
such a statute without careful scrutiny and study of policy considerations, section 247 of the
Ontario Business Corporations Act permits a creditor to assert a claim against a corporate-
debtor whose action is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregards, the
creditor's interests. Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. ch. B.16, § 248 (1990)
(Can.). See also Palmer v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Can. Ltd., 67 O.R.2d 161 (Can.
Div. Ct. 1989), where the court applied this statute to reach a result opposite to that
reached in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (discussed infra note 71).
30 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 16. Professor Mitchell's analysis is "limited to publicly
issued debt instruments of corporations with widely held stock." Id. at 1166 n.3.
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nized a duty of care to bondholders, one must ask whether the
status quo is justified."'" That, however, mischaracterizes the sta-
tus quo. It will be shown that commercial law already creates a
limited good faith duty on the part of a debtor-corporate or
not-to creditors,32 obviating much of the urgency to impose a
traditional fiduciary duty where none exists or should exist.33
Even if an urgency did exist, a fiduciary duty must arise from a
fiduciary relationship, meaning that "one man trusts in or relies
upon another ' 34 and that reliance is accepted by the other.35  Typi-
cal examples of fiduciary relationships are attorney and client,
principal and agent, executor and heir, and landlord and tenant.36
In a fiduciary relationship, good faith and fair dealing, rather than
legal obligation, form the basis of the transaction.37
A debtor-creditor relationship, however, is not one of trust or
reliance.38 It is adversarial, as opposed to fiduciary. If I lend you
money and you are obligated to repay it, no one would suggest that
you are my fiduciary. 39 By the same token, creditors are under no
31 Id. at 1209.
32 See infra part I.D.
33 See infra part III.D. The American Law Institute's manual on corporate governance
does not "take a position on the duty of directors or senior executives to creditors of the
corporation. These matters are left to the law of creditors' rights and bankruptcy and to
the protection offered under the law of contracts." 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCI-
PLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.04, at 257
(1994).
34 State ex rel. Harris v. Gautier, 147 So. 240, 242 (Fla. 1933); Peckham v. Johnson, 98
S.W.2d 408, 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), aff'd, 120 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1938).
35 Reynolds v. Wangelin, 53 N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ill. App. Ct. 1944); 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary
(1961). These are not, however, precise definitions. "[B]ecause the circumstances which
may create a fiduciary relationship are so varied, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to formulate a comprehensive definition ... that would fully and adequately embrace all
cases." Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 485 (Ky. 1991). A
relationship of trust or confidence appears essential. See Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Price of
Trust: An Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719 (1994). An inequality in the relationship, "giving to one advantages
over the other," also may be required. Yuster v. Keefe, 90 N.E. 920, 922 (Ind. App. 1910).
36 See National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U.S. 54 (1881); Robins v. Hope, 57 Cal. 497
(1881); Thomas v. Whitney, 57 N.E. 808 (I1. 1900).
37 State ex rel. Shriver v. Ellis, 75 N.E.2d 704, 710 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); 36A C.J.S.
Fiduciary (1961).
38 A debtor-creditor relationship is qualitatively different from the traditional examples
of fiduciary relationships. Even in a landlord-tenant relationship, which is perhaps the
closest fiduciary analogy, the landlord entrusts real property (by analogy, money) to a ten-
ant (debtor) pursuant to a lease (loan agreement). The tenant is in possession of, and must
care for and eventually return, the actual property leased. However, in the case of a loan,
the money loaned becomes solely the debtor's property, and can be used by the debtor
without restriction. There is no entrusting of property rights.
39 Cf. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that loan contracts do not create fiduciary relationships); Bratton,
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fiduciary obligation to their debtors.4" This Article will also show
that, notwithstanding Professor Mitchell's arguments,4' even the
relationship between public bondholders and debtors is not
fiduciary.4 z
Although debtor-creditor relationships are not fiduciary, com-
mercial law imposes a limited duty of good faith on lending rela-
tionships.43 This limited duty creates obligations between a debtor
and creditor that go beyond a purely legal relationship but, as will
be shown," do not offend the expectations of, or create uncertain-
ties for, the parties. This is important because imposing a fiduciary
standard on corporate debtors could impair the corporation's abil-
ity to take risks in its business. Risk taking is essential to business
transactions and should not be limited without compelling reasons.
D. Commercial Law Obligation of Good Faith
Commercial transactions have an implied obligation of good
faith, originating from the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and
supra note 13, at 731 ("no fiduciary duties directly arise between [a debtor] and its credi-
tors because no agency or trust relationship exists' between them").
40 See, e.g., In re Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co., 46 B.R. 125, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In
re Teltronic Servs., Inc., 29 B.R. 139, 169 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 762 F.2d 185 (2d
Cir. 1985). But see Barrett v. Bank of Am., N.T. and S.A., 224 Cal. Rptr. 76, 80-81 (Ct.
App. 1986) (fiduciary relationship arose which included a duty of the lender to disclose
certain facts to the borrower); Barnett Bank of W. Fla. v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla.
1986).
[Wihere a bank becomes involved in a transaction with a customer with whom
it has established a relationship of trust and confidence, and it is a transaction
from which the bank is likely to benefit at the customer's expense, the bank
may be found to have assumed a duty to disclose facts material to the
transaction.
Id.
41 See generally Mitchell, supra note 16.
42 See infra part I.D.2.
43 See discussion of the commercial law obligation of good faith, infra part I.D. For a
more complete explanation of the commercial law obligation of good faith, see Schwarcz,
supra note 18, and Schwarcz, supra note 9.
44 See infra part I.D. For example, a debtor-creditor relationship, such as between a
business and a single institutional lender, may be characterized by an ongoing course of
dealing. Although the relationship is not fiduciary, it may lack adversarial character. The
commercial law duty of good faith would recognize mutual understandings arising from
such particular courses of dealing. See infra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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common law principles of fairness.45 This obligation, in a debtor-
creditor relationship,46 has been described as follows:
Fairness helps to preserve expectations by ensuring that parties
are governed by neutral rules. In more limited circumstances,
fairness also can mean [A] that the law should protect weaker
parties, such as those with less bargaining power; [B] that oppor-
tunistic behavior should be prevented in circumstances that
could not have been contemplated in advance; and [C] that im-
plicit rules of conduct should be recognized if they arise from
widespread courses of dealing in an industry or from particular
courses of dealing between specific parties. 47
Therefore, even though only secured debtor-creditor relationships
are technically covered by the UCC, the commercial law obligation
of good faith is part of any debtor-creditor relationship, whether
secured or unsecured.48
How would the commercial law obligation of good faith apply
to a debtor-creditor relationship? Neutral rules means that the law
should not favor either party. This is, presently true absent a
debtor's bankruptcy. Under federal bankruptcy law, the automatic
45 See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994); Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 933-39; see also Kham &
Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990);
Neuman v. Pike, 591 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1979); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873,
879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
46 The commercial law obligation of good faith in the context of a sale of goods in-
cludes a broader concept of "fair dealing." The author believes that a broader standard is
inappropriate in a debtor-creditor relationship. The fair dealing relationship originated
under Article 2 of the UCC in transactions among "merchants," consisting of a specialized
community engaged in a high volume of undifferentiated transactions in goods without
sophisticated contracts and in an atmosphere of trust. See Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 959
n.181. Debtor-creditor relationships do not generally involve an atmosphere of trust. This
should not be confused with the corporate governance concept of fairness, which addresses
matters such as disclosure, pricing, and director disinterestedness. See 1 AMERICAN LAW
INsTrruTE, supra note 33, §§ 5.01-.16; see also HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER,
LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 238. at 102 (3d ed. 1983).
47 Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 913 n.7 (citations omitted). This formulation may be
slightly different from the usual concept of a hypothetical bargain. At least in a debtor-
creditor context, good faith would not, in and of itself, appear to permit a court to recog-
nize an implied term solely by asking what the parties would have agreed to had they
thought about the matter; a further inquiry must be made whether one of the parties is
weaker or whether the matter either could not have been contemplated in advance or
reflects an implicit rule of conduct that arises from a widespread industry course of dealing
or from a particular course of dealing between parties. See id. at 933-39. In this context,
compare Neuman, 591 F.2d at 195 (emphasis added), which suggested that implied terms
should be limited to what the parties would surely have agreed to had the matter come to
their attention: "[a] promise ... should be implied only if the court may rightfully assume
that the parties would have included it in their written agreement had their attention been
called to it."
48 See supra part I.C. Indeed, lender liability law itself may implicitly derive from this
good faith obligation, although lender liability, based on a creditor's obligation to the
debtor, is the reciprocal of the debtor's obligation to creditors discussed in this Article.
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stay and other rules favor debtor rehabilitation over creditor
rights. 49 However, those are policy choices in bankruptcy, and
therefore beyond the scope of this Article.
Holding aside for the moment the question of whether the
debtor or the creditor is the weaker party, the commercial law obli-
gation of good faith also means that opportunistic behavior should
be prevented in circumstances that could not have been contem-
plated in advance, and that implicit rules of conduct should be rec-
ognized if they arise from widespread courses of dealing in an
industry or from particular courses of dealing between specific par-
ties.50 These aspects of good faith "do not impair the [relative] ex-
pectations of the parties. In the former case, the parties could not
have expected the circumstances to occur and, therefore, could not
have formed expectations regarding it. In the latter case, the court
merely recognized the parties' mutual understanding. '"51
Because commentators advocating a traditional fiduciary rela-
tionship generally try to balance the "reasonable expectations" of
bondholders with the "legitimate business" needs of the debtor,
the commercial law obligation of good faith already may achieve
that balance without needing to impose fiduciary standards.-5
That leaves the question of how, if at all, the commercial law
obligation of good faith protects weaker creditors.53 Starting with
a typical debtor-creditor relationship, most jurisprudence assumes
that the debtor, not the creditor, is the weaker party. Witness
usury and consumer lending laws which originated in the context
where individuals were debtors. In a corporate debtor context,
however, the debtor may have significantly greater sophistication,
if not bargaining power, than a creditor. A case by case analysis is
therefore warranted.
49 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
50 Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 933-39.
51 Id. at 937-38; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp.
1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
52 Some commentators would go even further, however, and impose "community val-
ues of fairness and decency." Mitchell, supra note 16, at 1225. The commercial law obliga-
tion of good faith preserves expectations, but in an objective context. See supra text
accompanying notes 45-51.
53 This aspect of good faith is conceptually related to the focus on inequality in fiduci-
ary law, but without the element of trust or confidence. Nonetheless, it is part of the
continuum by which the law regulates fairness in private relationships. See Schwarcz,
supra note 9.
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1. Banks and Other Institutional Creditors
The most obvious corporate debtor-creditor relationship arises
out of bank financing. Typically, a bank, or sometimes a finance or
insurance company, 4 agrees to make loans to a corporate debtor
to fund its working capital or other business needs. These private
lending relationships between financial institutions and corpora-
tions involve sophisticated parties on both sides, and therefore
neither can be presumed to be a weaker party.
There remain, however, several classes of creditors that do
merit further inquiry as to whether they are "weaker" parties: pub-
lic bondholders, trade creditors, and tort and other involuntary
creditors.
2. Public Bondholders
Public bondholders are investors that lend money by investing
in long-term debt obligations (often called "bonds" or "deben-
tures") issued by a corporation or other institutional debtor. There
are three significant distinctions between public bondholders and
the prior category of private institutional creditors. First, the pub-
lic bondholders themselves rarely negotiate the covenants or other
contractual terms of their loan agreement; this is typically done by
investment bankers or similar persons who underwrite 55 the corpo-
ration's debt. The underwriter negotiates covenants that it believes
will be necessary to sell the debt to investors. 6
Some have argued that a corporation's board of directors
should have a fiduciary obligation to public bondholders because
the bondholders do not negotiate their own contract.5 7 That, how-
ever, goes too far.5 8 A fiduciary obligation only arises from a fidu-
54 A finance company is a financial institution that makes loans to companies in the
ordinary course of its business but is not regulated as a bank or insurance company. Exam-
ples include General Electric Capital Corporation, CIT Corporation, Heller Financial Cor-
poration, and Household Finance Corporation.
55 Underwriting means either buying the debt for resale or agreeing, usually on a "best
efforts" basis, to sell the debt to investors even though the underwriter itself does not
necessarily buy it.
56 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1509
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Since the underwriters must sell or place the bonds, they necessarily
negotiate in part with the interests of the buyers in mind."); Mitchell, supra note 16, at
1178-79.
57 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 16, at 1178-79.
58 Mitchell indeed goes much too far. He advocates that the remedy for violating his
suggested fiduciary duty "would be to declare an immediate default on the bonds, by per-
mitting the bondholders to demand repayment of principal and accrued interest, thus pre-
serving for them the basic underlying right which distinguishes bondholders from
stockholders." Id. at 1226. He believes that directors will weigh "the cost of a potential
acceleration of the bonds" with "the benefits [to shareholders] to be derived from under-
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ciary relationship, and this Article already has shown that a debtor-
creditor relationship does not create a traditional fiduciary rela-
tionship.59 Bondholders have no basis to trust or rely upon the cor-
porate debtor, and the corporate debtor does not accept the
bondholders' confidence. Rather, the underwriters negotiate the
covenants in anticipation of selling the bonds to investors. 60 Bond-
holders are protected by the federal securities law disclosure re-
quirements, which mandate prospectuses that accurately disclose
all material risks. 61 The disclosure levels the playing field of infor-
mation disparity.62 If the covenants and other protections are in-
sufficient, investors will not buy the bonds.63 Nonetheless, in the
taking the [proposed] transaction." Id. That, however, is extremely unlikely. Acceleration
will cross-default to, and thereby allow acceleration of, all of the corporation's other debt,
creating a liquidity crisis and most likely forcing the corporation into bankruptcy.
59 Cf. the discussion in supra part I.C setting forth elements of a fiduciary relation.
60 If a traditional fiduciary relation exists at all, it would appear to be more logically
based on the relationship between the bondholders and the underwriters who negotiate the
bond covenants, effectively on their own behalf. That, however, is an issue beyond the
scope of this Article. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in
Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931, 981
(1993):
Our findings are inconsistent with those commentators who claim that bond-
holders cannot obtain effective contractual protection. These commentators
argue that, because bondholders do not negotiate the contractual terms of a
bond, they need extra-contractual protection. We find, however, that bond-
holders did obtain substantial contractual protection in the wake of the RJR
buyout.
61 Sections 7 and 10 of the Securities Act of 1933 impose standards of disclosure and
require the filing of a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with any public offering of nonexempt securities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j
(1994). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also imposes liability on the corporation for
certain types of fraudulent statements or omissions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).
62 In the case of the sale of public bonds, the risks are disclosed. Compare this to the
law that is developing to regulate the sale of derivatives. Buyers who are injured argue
that sellers have not adequately disclosed the risks. In Bankers Trust Int'l Pic v. PT
Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera, 1994 Folio Nos. 2168 and 1396 English High Ct. of Justice, Com-
mercial Ct., Dec. 1, 1995, the court held that Bankers Trust did not violate a fiduciary duty
under English law when it sold derivatives to the Indonesian financial services firm.
Dharmala argued that Bankers had a duty of care to disclose "the risks and potential finan-
cial consequences to [Dharmala] of accepting them." Dominic Bencivenga, Blueprint for
Dealers: U.K. Derivatives Ruling Guide for U.S. Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 14, 1995, at 5
(alteration in original). The court, influenced at least in part by contractual disclaimers
that Dharmala could "judge the suitability of any advice given," id., and that Bankers Trust
was "not obligated to warn [Dharmala]," id. (alteration in original), of the risks involved,
ruled that Dharmala "was basically making its own assessment of the suitability and risks
of the transaction." Id.
63 See, e.g., Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 155 Cal. Rptr. 94, 103 (Ct. App. 1979) (no
fiduciary rights existed as to bondholders because investors would shop in market offering
debentures); see also infra text accompanying note 65 (arguing that bondholders expect
risks and bargain for higher rates in return or choose to invest in other securities). But cf.
Mitchell, supra note 16, at 1221 ("[G]iven my view of legal principles as expressing higher
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author's experience, covenants in public bond loan agreements
(usually called "indentures") are weaker than in a privately negoti-
ated loan agreement.64 That, however, is insufficient to impose a
higher commercial law obligation of good faith, much less a fiduci-
ary duty, on the corporate debtor; weaker covenants are compen-
sated for by higher interest rates.65
social goals . . .I reject the use of market forces, even if remedially effective, as an ade-
quate means of addressing bondholders' problems."). Mitchell argues that protections af-
forded public bondholders by contract interpretation, even if providing some remediation,
would be inadequate given his view that a fiduciary relationship exists. The author dis-
agrees with Mitchell on this point.
64 Although public bond indenture covenants are thought to be weaker because under-
writers do not vigorously represent the bondholders' interests, the more likely reason they
are weaker is that in public transactions the debtor cannot practically go back to the inves-
tors, who may be widely dispersed and whose identities may be hard to determine, for
consents to amend or waive covenants. There is a premium that is paid for the covenants
being more flexible. The debtor pays this premium in the interest rate on the bonds.
Nonetheless, the rate sometimes may end up being lower than on private debt because
investors are desirous of investing in public bonds, which are freely tradable. See
Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 148.
65 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 565, 621 (1995) ("Though the direct evidence on pricing [of publicly issued
bonds] is sparse, there do not appear to be substantial imperfections in the pricing of legal
terms: the bulk of the relevant studies shows that legal terms are priced and that the mar-
ket for newly issued bonds works well."). "While a valid argument can be made that a
fiduciary duty to bondholders is desirable, there are also strong arguments that such a duty
is not desirable. Thus, the case for fiduciary duties falls short of what would be required to
justify their imposition as a mandatory term." Id. at 622. An article in Business Week,
describing the uproar in the public bond markets from Marriott's corporate split and the
resulting fall in bond value, is instructive:
No more Marriotts. That's the battle cry, of disgruntled bondholders after
the lodging company skewered them last fall with a proposal to split itself into a
highly profitable hotel operator and a so-so hotel-property owner .... Marri-
ott's stock price has surged 35%, while its bonds have dropped 30%.
[Institutional investors in public debt] are calling for tighter covenants in
bond contracts to thwart recurrences. ...
Not likely. Bondholders can-and will-fuss all they like. But the reality
is, their options are limited: Higher returns or better protection. Most investors
will continue to go for the gold....
You can look it up. Four years ago, in the wake of the RJR Nabisco Inc.
takeover, bondholders were shocked when the company's vast new debt drove
its bonds into junk status, wiping out millions of dollars' worth of value. The
bond buyers' response in 1989 was to insist on "event-risk" language for invest-
ment-grade debt issues: Covenants requiring companies to redeem bonds at
face value if they get hit with a lower credit rating.
These hard-line covenants, also known as "poison puts," faded fast,
though: The number of issues so protected, 40 in 1989, dropped to 6 last
year ....
[Loose-covenant bonds may be] more attractive. Their greater risk means
they pay higher yields-up to .06 points more than downgrade-protected debt
instruments....
And bond investors, compensated with richer yields, will have short mem-
ories. Caveat emptor.
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The second distinction between public and private debt is that
public debt is freely traded in the capital markets and, therefore,
less likely to be held to maturity. To facilitate trading, bonds are
typically rated by one or more nationally recognized securities rat-
ing agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, when they
are originally issued.66 The market trading value of the bonds is
therefore a function not only of the interest rate on the bonds but
also of their rating. If a debtor's financial condition deteriorates,
the rating on its bonds may be lowered, or "downgraded." A rat-
ings downgrade will lower the market trading value of the bonds.
However, the risk of a downgrade is disclosed in prospectuses pur-
suant to which bonds are publicly issued,67 and bondholders cannot
argue that they were unaware of the risk.
Is there, nonetheless, an obligation on the part of a debtor not
to injure bondholders by acting in a way that would cause a ratings
downgrade? Under the commercial law obligation of good faith,
no such duty would exist unless the debtor's action constituted
"opportunistic behavior.., that could not have been contemplated
in advance '68 or that violated "widespread courses of dealing in
[the debtor's] industry or . . . particular courses of dealing be-
tween 69 the debtor and its creditors.7 ° Whether a debtor's action
would fall within one of these categories is a question of fact.7'
The third distinction between public and private debt is that
investors in public debt are often assumed to be the proverbial
Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without Notice, Bus. WK., Mar.
29. 1993, at 34.
If investors want greater security, they can choose to invest in government securities.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 1989 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416, 1430 (arguing that all corporate governance terms are priced adequately and
accurately in the market, notwithstanding any lack of widespread knowledge, whether or
not negotiated).
66 The highest rating is AAA. Ratings as low as BBB are referred to as "investment
grade," with ratings below that regarded as speculative.
67 Disclosure of this risk is required under section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, which
mandates disclosure of all material risks. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
68 Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 913 n.7.
69 Id.
70 See id.
71 See infra part III for an application of this standard to representative corporate
transactions such as corporate splits, securitizations, and leveraged transactions. The one
court that has considered whether a debtor is obligated to public bondholders not to cause
a ratings downgrade held it is not so obligated. In Metropolitan Life, the court ruled on the
facts before it that insurance company investors in RJR Nabisco's public debt had no claim
against the company resulting from its leveraged buyout that downgraded the public debt
from investment grade to speculative ratings. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1521-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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"widows and orphans.""2 In reality, however, public debt investors
are often the same financial institutions that invest in private
debt.73 In addition, the face amount of a bond is rarely less than
$5,000, suggesting that even individual investors are somewhat so-
phisticated. The author is therefore reluctant to suggest that inves-
tors in public bonds should be categorically assumed to be
"weaker" than the corporate debtor.
3. Trade Creditors
Trade creditors constitute the next class of creditors that mer-
its further inquiry. They are persons that sell goods or provide
services to the corporation, which in turn promises to pay them at a
later date.4
Trade creditors enter into consensual, as opposed to involun-
tary, private relationships with corporate debtors, whether or not
those relationships are evidenced by formal contracts. It is not
compelling to argue that they are "weaker" than the corporate
debtors with which they deal, as many trade creditors are them-
selves major corporations, such as IBM (supplying computers), or
Xerox (selling or leasing photocopiers), or U.S. Steel (selling steel
to be used in manufacturing a product). Furthermore, trade credi-
tors have various ways to protect themselves at the initial transac-
tion stage, such as shortening payment terms75 or requiring
contemporaneous or even prior payment.76 Trade creditors seek-
ing additional protection can even demand purchase money secur-
ity interests to secure repayment.77
4. Tort and Other Involuntary Creditors
The last class of creditors that merits further inquiry is that of
tort and other involuntary creditors. Tort creditors, for example,
are persons with claims against the corporation arising out of
wrongs that the corporation, intentionally or negligently, may have
caused. Tort claims do not arise out of a contractual or even con-
sensual relationship, and the creditors have no opportunity to ne-
gotiate (nor are they direct beneficiaries of) covenants. They
therefore may well be weaker parties in the commercial law sense.
72 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1994).
73 See Metropolitan Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1504.
74 See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1994).
75 An example of this is shortening the time for payment from the standard 60, 90, or
120 days to 30 days or less.
76 These terms are referred to as "cash on delivery" (COD) and "cash before delivery"
(CBD).
77 See U.C.C. § 9-107 (1994).
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Nevertheless, the sole hope of tort creditors is that the corpo-
ration will be solvent to repay them. Tort claims have no trading
market, and often are prohibited by law from being sold. 78 Tort
creditors, therefore, are already protected under fraudulent con-
veyance law,79 which limits a debtor from conveying assets or in-
curring obligations without obtaining a reasonably equivalent value
in return if the debtor is, or would thereby be rendered, insolvent.8 °
To impose a greater obligation on solvent corporate debtors would
restrict the corporation without necessarily benefiting the tort
creditors.8'
In summary, creditors are not per se "weaker parties" whom
the law should specially protect,82 for purposes of the commercial
law obligation of good faith. Each creditor should therefore be
owed only a limited obligation of good faith by a debtor, to prevent
opportunistic behavior that could not have been contemplated in
advance and to abide by rules of conduct that arise from wide-
spread courses of industry dealing or particular courses of dealing
between the parties. This limited obligation, which arises under
commercial law, should be the same for a corporate debtor as for a
non-corporate debtor.83
A non-corporate debtor's obligation to creditors can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. The debtor is bound according to its explicit contractual
obligations, including covenants.
2. The debtor also has an implied commercial law obliga-
tion of good faith to creditors.' That obligation, however, is
limited, and does not embrace a broad notion of "fair deal-
78 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-101 (McKinney 1989); Clarance E. Hagglund
& Britton D. Weimer, Assignability of Tort and Breach of Contract Claims, 39 FED'N OF
INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 303 (1989).
79 See supra discussions in part I.B.
80 Insolvency goes beyond balance sheet insolvency. Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 729
n.3.
81 But cf. infra note 137, explaining that this is somewhat of an oversimplification be-
cause increased leverage can make a corporate debtor more vulnerable to business
reverses.
82 One example of such a weaker party would be a consumer.
83 Another source of law for a corporation's obligations to creditors is fraud. Absent
fraudulent conveyance law, discussed supra part I.B, these laws, arising under state com-
mon law and federal and state securities laws, are limited in their application to conflicts
between shareholders and creditors. The obvious example would be a corporation's issu-
ance of debt securities without adequate disclosure of contemplated actions that would
benefit shareholders but might materially adversely affect the securityholders. Some of the
bondholders in the Marriott split litigation made that argument. However, a corporation
can satisfy this obligation by proper disclosure.
84 See-supra part I.D.
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ing. ' '85 Commercial law does not create a traditional fiduciary
relationship.
3. Fraudulent conveyance laws further restrict a debtor's
ability to transfer an asset or to incur an obligation either when
insolvent or when the transfer or incurrence would make it in-
solvent or with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.
II. DERIVING A UNIFIED THEORY FROM THESE SOURCES OF
LAW
A debtor's obligation to creditors arises from various sources
of law. This part attempts to derive a unified theory of a corporate
debtor's obligation to creditors by examining the obligation of a
non-corporate debtor, and then analyzing whether the result
changes when the debtor is a corporation.
A. Solvent and Insolvent Corporations
So long as a corporation is solvent, a corporate debtor should
have no different obligations than a non-corporate debtor.86 In
general, directors of a solvent corporation owe fiduciary obliga-
tions solely to shareholders.87 The commercial law obligation of
85 See supra part I.D; see also Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 934, 959-62.
86 This is true subject to the discussions of "vicinity of insolvency" and "contingent
insolvency."
87 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). Directors are obligated to consider
the "best interests" of the corporation-interests that have traditionally been synonymous
with its shareholders' interests. Directors are not prevented from considering other inter-
ests so long as the shareholders' interests are not disserved. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom
Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16
DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 47 (1991). Codification of the directors' obligation has occurred in so-
called "constituency statutes." However, "constituency statutes are a redundancy," id., be-
cause they echo the directors' common law obligation to consider the best interests of the
corporation. "[T]he typical statute ... will have little or no effect on decisions courts
would reach, absent statute." Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search For
Perspective, 46 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1375 (1991). Some states have specifically passed constitu-
ency statutes that expand the directors' consideration beyond the shareholders to a discre-
tionary consideration of the interests of creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers,
and some to even include the community, state, region, nation, and society. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (1994); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (1992 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 716 (West 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B,
§ 65 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-
8.30(d) (Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-
35(D) (Michie Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Baldwin 1995); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1995). These statutes were passed in the late 1980s when
corporate raiding was rampant. "[C]onstituency statutes are intended to emphasize the
primacy of the interest of the corporate entity over the short-term interests of arbitrageurs
and others interested in quick takeover profits." Craig C. Albert, The Lawyer-Director:
An Oxymoron?, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 413, 429 (1996). Several states specifically lim-
ited the directors' consideration of other constituencies to those situations when an acquisi-
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good faith already provides a limited good faith duty of the debtor
to creditors, and there is nothing about shareholder ownership that
would expand that duty.8 s
However, where a corporation is insolvent, the model of a
non-corporate debtor is inadequate because corporate ownership
and creditors' rights converge in insolvency. This subpart will show
that creditors then take on rights traditionally associated with own-
ership, and therefore, in that context, corporate directors owe a
fiduciary duty to creditors as well as shareholders.
An owner of an asset generally has burdens and benefits asso-
ciated with the asset.8 9 Ownership, however, is sometimes a con-
tinuum in which the benefits and burdens can shift.90 Similarly, a
shareholder's burdens and benefits blend with those of a creditor
when the corporation becomes insolvent. To understand why, it is
first necessary to analyze how rights differ between shareholders
and creditors of a solvent corporation.
Shareholders and creditors of a solvent corporation have very
different rights. A shareholder has the right to all of the corpora-
tion's "equity" value once creditors are paid. A shareholder has no
right to interest, but does have an expectation of dividends if the
tion proposal is under review. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANr. § 10-2702 (1996); IDAHO CODE §§
30-1602, -1702 (1995); IowA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:92 G (West 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon 1991). The Connecticut legisla-
ture imposed a mandatory obligation (as opposed to the discretionary obligation codified
by the other states) on directors of public corporations to consider both long- and short-
term interests of the shareholders as well as the employees, customers, creditors, suppliers,
the community, and society, only when selling corporate assets, but even this statute has
been repealed, effective January 1, 1997. 1994 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. 186 (S.H.B. 5712)
(West); CONN. GEN. STAT. Arm. § 33-313 (West 1987). Only three states, Indiana, Iowa,
and Pennsylvania, have granted non-shareholder constituencies the potential of equal
weight with shareholders by stating that the "directors shall not be required ... to regard
any corporate interest ... as a dominant or controlling interest or factor." 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 515 (1995); see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f) (Burns 1995); IOWA CODE
Arm. § 491.101B (West 1991) (application limited to control share acquisition proposals
and business combinations). Therefore, the impact of constituency statutes is doubtful.
Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors'
Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1511-12 n.87 (1993).
88 Cf. Bratton, supra note 13, at 734 ("No change in financial fundamentals has altered
the interests of stockholders and creditors of solvent corporations so as to change the rela-
tive weights of the interests thus balanced.").
89 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts are Greater Than the Whole: How Securi-
tization of Divisible Interests can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital
Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 139; cf. Peter V.
Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Sale of Financial Assets, Bus. LAW. (forthcoming 1996) (on
file with author).
90 See supra note 89. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-401, 9-202 (1994). At least in commercial law,
rights no longer depend on property law concepts of ownership.
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corporation is profitable as well as a right to elect directors. A
creditor, on the other hand, has a right to repayment that is senior
to that of shareholders, and also a right to be paid interest, but no
right to an upside.91
Insolvency, however, makes shareholder rights more like
those of a creditor, and creditor rights more like traditional owner-
ship. Shareholders of an insolvent corporation have no expecta-
tion of either dividends92 or equity.93 Other than the right to elect
directors, 94 shareholders of an insolvent corporation are in no dif-
ferent position than if they were subordinated creditors where se-
nior debt exceeded assets.95
Creditors of an insolvent corporation, however, not only have
a senior right to repayment but they also now have the right, tradi-
tionally associated with ownership, to the "upside" in value of the
corporate debtor's assets, at least until the corporation regains sol-
vency.96 This right is similar to a shareholder's right to the equity
of a solvent corporation: in economic terms, the creditors have now
become the primary residual claimants. Another way of thinking
about this is that, absent insolvency, creditors can protect their
rights by enforcing payment terms in their contract, whereas share-
holders must rely on directors. But in insolvency, the value of the
contractual payment terms becomes doubtful unless directors can
increase the corporation's value. 97 The fiduciary obligation that di-
91 See U.C.C. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2) (1994). For a comparison of debt and equity in the
context of a privately-held corporation, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 274-75 n.8 (1986).
92 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(a) (McKinney 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a)
(1991).
93 Insolvency means there is no equity because liabilities exceed assets.
94 This is not a meaningful distinction between shareholders and creditors if the direc-
tors have fiduciary obligations to both while in insolvency.
95 By way of comparison, creditors of an insolvent individual are subject to historically
protected rights of the individual to achieve a fresh start. Even her existing assets cannot
be taken completely away. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1994). See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (liquidation pri-
orities); § 1129(b)(2) (cram down). See Schwarcz, supra note 27.
96 Creditors of an insolvent corporation are entitled to any increase in the corporation's
value until assets are sufficient to pay liabilities. Thereafter, shareholders would be enti-
tled to any additional increase in value. Accordingly, the more insolvent the corporation,
the greater the creditors' (and the more remote the shareholders') right to an upside. This
is why this Article later proposes that "the more insolvent the corporation is or would
become, the more the fiduciary obligation shifts from shareholders to creditors, in a contin-
uum." See infra part II.C.4 (emphasis added). Accord Lin, supra note 87, at 1491-92 (ob-
serving that creditors of an insolvent corporation acquire the status of residual claimants
with limited upside potential).
97 Cf. Bratton, supra note 13, at 733 (footnotes omitted):
[S]o long as the corporate debtor remains able to repay the debt, creditors'
interests have not been impaired sufficiently to justify legal restraints on the
corporation's self-interested actions. A different judgment is made regarding
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rectors previously owed only to shareholders as owners of the cor-
poration 98 therefore should, in the case of an insolvent corporation,
also extend to creditors, whose rights have been transformed by
insolvency into equity-type rights.99 Indeed, that is what the courts,
at least in Delaware and certain other states, have held. 1°° Further-
more, although this Article does not rely on the trust fund doc-
trine, 10 1 courts applying that doctrine have similarly held that
directors of an insolvent corporation have a fiduciary obligation to
creditors. 02
insolvent corporate debtors. Because insolvency jeopardizes repayment, the
balance of interests shifts to favor the creditors, giving rise to consumer protec-
tion in law.
98 See supra part I.C and text accompanying note 85.
99 Accord Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications
Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992). Cf. Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Does a Corporation's
Board of Directors Owe a Fiduciary Duty to its Creditors?, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 589, 593-95,
621 (1994) (citations omitted) (arguing that the "trust fund" doctrine-a doctrine "often
... repudiated as a fiction unsound in principle and vexing in business practice," to the
effect that corporate directors as agents of the corporation may be held liable "when they
have participated in tortious acts of the corporation"-"does not support an implied fidu-
ciary duty by corporate directors that runs directly to the creditors of a solvent or nearly
insolvent corporation"). Because this Article does not rely on the trust fund doctrine,
Beveridge's argument is not relevant to its conclusions.
100 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986);
Geyer, 621 A.2d at 784 (holding that, under Delaware case law and the ordinary meaning
of the word "insolvent," insolvency in fact is sufficient to invoke the insolvency exception
which confers fiduciary duties on directors in respect to creditors); see also 1 JAMES D.
Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 10.18 (1995) ("There is a developing body of law that sug-
gests directors do owe a fiduciary duty to creditors when the corporation is insolvent or is
approaching insolvency."); Lin, supra note 87, at 1512 ("There is, however, an important
yet ill-defined exception to the legal primacy of shareholder interests. Several courts have
held that once the corporation becomes insolvent, directors owe a fiduciary duty to credi-
tors." (citing In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985) (interpreting Vermont
law); Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981) (interpreting New
York law) (superseded by state statute); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692
F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982) (interpreting South Carolina law); Brown v. Presbyterian
Ministers Fund, 484 F.2d 998, 1005 (3d Cir. 1973) (interpreting Pennsylvania law) (super-
seded by state statute); Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. Wharton, 358 F.2d 587, 590 (2d
Cir. 1966) (interpreting Indiana law); In re Xonics, Inc., 99 Bankr. 870, 872 (Bankr. N.D.
I11. 1989); In re Holly Hill Medical Ctr.. Inc., 53 Bankr. 412, 413-14 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1985); In re IMI, Inc., 17 Bankr. 784, 786-87 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982); In re Roberts, Inc.,
15 Bankr. 584, 586 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1981); A.R. Teeters & Assoc., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 836 P.2d 1034, 1043 (Ariz. 1992); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824
(N.J. 1981); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975); Snyder Elec. Co. v. Fleming, 305 N.W.2d
863, 869 (Minn. 1981); Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 561 P.2d 367, 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977);
Hixson v. Pride of Texas Distrib. Co., Inc., 683 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985))).
101 See supra note 99.
102 HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 46, at 626; cf Lin, supra note 87, at 1513 n.92:
The courts have reasoned that, upon insolvency, the directors become "trust-
ees" for the creditors and hold corporate assets as a "trust fund" for the benefit
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B. Contingent Insolvency
The foregoing analysis showed that directors of an insolvent
corporation have a fiduciary obligation to creditors as well as to
shareholders. The concept of insolvency, however, recently has
been extended by at least one noted judge to corporations that are
not technically insolvent but merely in the "vicinity of insolvency."
The rationale is that shareholders of corporations near insolvency
have nothing to lose and everything to gain by the corporation's
engaging in risky ventures that might dramatically increase equity
even if those ventures have a negative expected value. 0 3
In the case of Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications, °4
Chancellor William Allen, one of the nation's most respected
judges on corporation law, ruled that directors of a Delaware cor-
poration that is in the vicinity of insolvency have an obligation to
creditors as well as shareholders. This Article will suggest a nar-
rowing of Chancellor Allen's approach. It is first necessary, how-
ever, to understand Credit Lyonnais.
Pathe Communications Corp. (the "Parent Shareholder")
owned almost all of the stock of MGM-Pathe Communications Co.
(the "Subsidiary"). Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland had made
loans both to the Parent Shareholder and to the Subsidiary in con-
nection with a leveraged buyout of the predecessor of the Subsidi-
ary by Giancarlo Paretti and others.
of these investors. See Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d at 976-77; Clarkson Co. Ltd.,
660 F.2d at 512; Automatic Canteen Co. [of Am.], 358 F.2d at 590; New York
Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau [v. Weiss], 110 N.E.2d [397,] 398 [(1953)].
Therefore, the directors of an insolvent corporation "occupy a fiduciary posi-
tion towards the creditors, just as they do toward the corporation when it is
solvent." Automatic Canteen Co. [of Am.], 358 F.2d at 590.
See also Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616, 624 (1874) ("[T]hey had the custody and charge
of ... the corporation. And they held it in a very legitimate sense as trustees. Certainly
they were the trustees of the stockholders, and also, to a considerable degree, of the bond-
holders, owners of the mortgage."). Accord Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808,
813 (Del. 1944) ("The fact which creates the trust is the insolvency, and when that fact is
established, the trust arises, and the legality of the acts thereafter performed will be de-
cided by very different principles than in the case of solvency."). See also N.Y. Credit
Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397, 399 (1953): "[A] trust arises,
whether or not equitable proceedings have been commenced, immediately upon insolvency
of the corporation." McDonnell, supra note 6, at 192 (quoting Gregory Varallo & Jessee
A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the Financially Troubled Company, 48
Bus. LAw. 239, 247 (1992). See id. at 186-87 (discussing the trust fund doctrine since its
promulgation by Justice Story in Wood v. Drummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No.
17,944)).
103 This dilemma would not arise for a non-corporate debtor because insolvency does
not artificially cut off ownership value; corporate shareholders, in contrast, only can look to
the value of the corporation's equity.
104 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. Civ. A.
12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
Unfortunately, only months after the leveraged buyout was
consummated, trade creditors forced the Subsidiary into an invol-
untary bankruptcy case, although the Subsidiary had emerged from
bankruptcy at the time of the action in controversy. By reason of
defaults by the Parent Shareholder on its loans from Credit Lyon-
nais, which were secured by stock of the Subsidiary, Credit Lyon-
nais took over voting control of the Subsidiary's stock. Also,
pursuant to a corporate governance agreement entered into by the
parties and a related interim court order, the powers of the board
of directors of the Subsidiary were exercised on a day-to-day basis
by an executive committee consisting of directors who were not
nominees of the Parent Shareholder.
The controversy arose when the executive committee voted
against selling the Subsidiary's interest in a foreign movie distribu-
tion consortium. Giancarlo Paretti, on behalf of the Parent Share-
holder, claimed that the executive committee's decision breached a
fiduciary duty of the directors to the Parent Shareholder because
the sale was supported by, and arguably would have benefited, the
Parent Shareholder. The court ruled that the executive commit-
tee's decision was valid. Pointing out that the Subsidiary only re-
cently emerged from bankruptcy and the directors still "labored in
the shadow of that prospect,' 10 5 Chancellor Allen stated that "[a]t
least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency,
a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue [sic] risk
bearers [i.e. the shareholders], but owes its duty to the corporate
enterprise [including creditors]."' °6 Chancellor Allen, in his widely
cited footnote number 55, went on to attempt to clarify and quan-
tify this duty.
Citing a hypothetical corporation whose sole asset is a judg-
ment for $51 million that is being appealed, and whose sole liability
is $12 million owed to bondholders, the judge considered a range
of probable outcomes, including settlement of the lawsuit and con-
tinued litigation. In considering these outcomes, he noted that the
value of the corporation, measured by the expected value of the
judgment on appeal and discounted for the possibility that the
judgment might be modified or reversed, was $15.55 million. The
105 Id. at *34.
106 Id. Although Chancellor Allen's phrase "corporate enterprise" is broad, "context as
well as prior usage suggest that the court intended the phrase to include only holders of
debt and equity rather than more removed constituencies such as labor, environmental
advocates, or the corporation's local community." Vladimir Jelisavcic, Comment, A Safe
Harbor to Define the Limits of Directors' Fiduciary Duty to Creditors in the "Vicinity of
Insolvency": Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe, 18 J. CORP. L. 145, 152 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
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judge concluded that the directors of the corporation owed a duty
to the "community of interests that the corporation represents" 10 7
to accept the best settlement offer that would equal or exceed
$15.55 million (the enterprise value), and to reject any settlement
offer below that amount. The heart of Chancellor Allen's argu-
ment was that a shareholder may well want to hold out for a higher
settlement amount because a $15.55 million settlement would pay
only $3.55 million ($15.55 million minus $12 million) to sharehold-
ers, whereas continued litigation might result in a much larger re-
covery for shareholders.
The Credit Lyonnais case raises three questions: (1) is the ex-
tension of a fiduciary duty to creditors justified absent actual insol-
vency; (2) if so, what does "vicinity of insolvency" mean; and (3)
how would the case be applied beyond the pristine example given
by Chancellor Allen? One would begin to answer the first ques-
tion by observing that an insolvent debtor that is not a corporation
owes no fiduciary10 8 obligation to creditors. Therefore, the analysis
shifts to examining how the result changes when the debtor is a
corporation.
Shareholders of a solvent corporation, even one that is highly
leveraged or has minimal net worth, still expect dividends and an
equity upside, and creditors still expect payment of principal and
interest but no upside. Shareholder and creditor rights merge to
create a fiduciary obligation'0 9 to creditors only where the corpora-
tion becomes insolvent. This Article therefore proposes that a cor-
poration has a fiduciary obligation to creditors only where it is
actually insolvent or where its action would cause insolvency,"10
thereby causing shareholder and creditor rights to merge.
This analysis also answers the second question: What does "vi-
cinity of insolvency" mean? It is not-or at least should not be-a
vague conception of high leverage or minimal net worth. Directors
who are expected to labor under a dual loyalty must be able to
determine when that loyalty arises. Because a solvent corporation
has a fiduciary duty to creditors only where its action would cause
107 Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55.
108 Creditors of an insolvent debtor may, however, have certain rights under fraudulent
conveyance law. See supra part I.B. Those rights, however, exist to avoid transfers of
assets and incurrences of debt, and do not arise out of a fiduciary relationship.
109 See infra part II.C.
110 Compare fraudulent conveyance law, discussed supra part I.B, which can be used to
avoid certain asset transfers or obligations incurred by a debtor that is or would thereby
become insolvent. Fraudulent conveyance law, however, does not create a fiduciary obli-
gation to creditors.
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insolvency,"' the term vicinity of insolvency should, therefore, only
mean those circumstances. It is not the corporation's closeness to
insolvency that is relevant, but rather whether, under the circum-
stances, a corporation's contemplated action would cause"12 insol-
vency, meaning that insolvency is one of the reasonably expected
outcomes." 3 Perhaps a better term for vicinity of insolvency there-
fore should be "contingent insolvency." '"14
The third question raised by Credit Lyonnais is how it would
be applied beyond the pristine example given by Chancellor Allen.
To apply Allen's test, directors would have to determine whether
or not the proposed action would have a negative expected value
to the enterprise. That, however, may be difficult to determine for
an operating company. Also, to the extent that determination re-
quires valuation, it would be costly. Furthermore, the results can
vary dramatically, depending on the assumptions used, creating po-
tential liability for directors. 15
This Article, therefore, questions valuation or any other ap-
proach that tries to substitute formulas for basic business judg-
ment. Rather, because contingent insolvency is significant only
because it means that insolvency is a reasonable expectation, the
111 See supra part II.A.
112 The standard of "would cause" is a judgment call, but the author suggests it should
only include circumstances where insolvency is one of the reasonably expected outcomes.
The business judgment rule would protect directors who, in good faith, determine that
insolvency is not a reasonably expected outcome, even if insolvency actually results. See
infra text accompanying notes 115-19.
113 By insolvency, the author means that the corporation's liabilities exceed its assets.
See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789 (Del. Ch. 1992) (holding that
insolvency for purposes of the fiduciary duty to creditors occurs where the corporation
"has liabilities in excess of a reasonable market value of assets held," thereby jeopardizing
payment of debt). Compare Stephen H. Case, Rights of Creditors to Sue Corporate Direc-
tors for Breach of Fiduciary Duty in America, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 311 (1994) (arguing that
insolvency should be defined by a bankruptcy law standard) with Jelisavcic, supra note 106
(arguing in favor of Altman's "Z-score" model).
114 A concept of "vicinity of insolvency" is not necessary to avoid the apparent disconti-
nuity caused by extending fiduciary rights to creditors of an insolvent, but not a solvent,
corporation. It is not as if a $1 increase in a corporation's liabilities, making a borderline
solvent corporation become insolvent, radically changes director obligations. This Article
only proposes that directors of insolvent corporations have fiduciary obligations to credi-
tors as well as to shareholders. The greater the insolvency, the more those obligations
would shift from shareholders to creditors, in a continuum. See infra part III.D.
115 Compare this with the valuation requirement under the cram down test used in con-
firming a bankruptcy plan of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1994). Parties often
compromise their claims in order to reach a consensual plan and thereby avoid the time,
expense, and possible litigation that valuation entails. See Richard F. Broude, Cramdown
and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAW. 441
(1984); Peter V. Pantaleo, Reorganization Value, 51 Bus. LAW. 419 (1996).
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duty of directors faced with a corporation's contingent insolvency
should be similar to the duty of directors of an insolvent
corporation.
It already has been shown that directors of an insolvent corpo-
ration have a fiduciary duty to creditors as well as shareholders. 116
Current law, however, does not provide any hard and fast rules
upon which a director may rely in discharging this duty. Managing
a corporation requires making judgment calls, and directors are
protected from' being second-guessed by the business judgment
rule. ' 17 Although a complete discussion of dual loyalty is beyond
the scope of this Article, the focus should be on the balance be-
tween protecting creditors and not discouraging a corporation's
ability to innovate and take appropriate business risks.' 18 A lead-
ing practitioner has summarized the issues as follows:
What about the duty of undivided loyalty? Does the conflict of
interest between the shareholders and the creditors [of an insol-
vent corporation] present the director with inescapable expo-
sure to personal liability? The answer is clearly "No". [sic]
Several protective mechanisms can be put to work, in both the
easier cases involving this problem and the more complex." 9
116 See supra part II.A.
117 See supra note 112. "If [the presence of a business decision, disinterestedness and
independence, due care, good faith, and the absence of an abuse of discretion] are pres-
ent-and they are presumed to be present-and the case does not involve fraud, illegality,
ultra vires conduct or waste, then the court will not second guess the merits of the deci-
sion." DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 3 (4th ed. 1993). The
rule has been stated as follows: "A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound busi-
ness judgment, and its decision will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any ra-
tional business purpose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute its own
notions of what is or is not sound business judgment." Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del.
1993); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van
Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Aronsohn v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
118 This balancing would help to resolve the dilemma of creditors and shareholders of an
insolvent corporation, each seeking to seize assets to the detriment of the other. "Share-
holders' and creditors' races to the [insolvent] firm's assets are detrimental to each others'
interests. Both groups may accelerate the eventual demise of the corporation, not because
of the corporation's declining financial health, but because of their opportunistic behav-
ior." Lin, supra note 87, at 1494.
119 Case, supra note 113, at 331. Case argues that, although there are
no reported judicial precedents regarding this situation in the context of the
director of [an] insolvent corporation ... many precedents exist in the field of
personal trusts, where it is well settled that the fiduciary faced with conflict of
beneficiaries is protected from liability if he or she remains impartial and fairly
resolves the dispute without abuse of discretion.
Id. Case also suggests that director conflicts between common and preferred shareholders
may be a precedent for resolving conflicts between shareholders and creditors. The ration-
ale for this is that claims of preferred shareholders have priority over common sharehold-
ers, just as claims of creditors have priority over shareholders generally. Id. at 326-27.
Even if some directors, by reason of holding a material personal financial stake in the
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To illustrate the difference between Chancellor Allen's enter-
prise value test and the balancing approach proposed in this Arti-
cle, consider a "double-or-nothing gamble" by a corporation with
assets of $100, debt of $90, and equity of $10.120 The corporation
takes a risk that gives it a fifty percent chance of doubling its assets
to $200 and a fifty percent chance of losing all its assets. This gam-
ble would appear to be acceptable under Chancellor Allen's test121
because it does not change the corporation's value ex ante. The
problem, however, is that it cuts the debt's value in half because
the debt doesn't share in the upside, and creditors have a fifty per-
cent chance of losing everything.
Even if one varies the numbers in the double-or-nothing gam-
ble to make them more realistic, the problem remains. For exam-
ple, a corporation considers taking an action that, if successful, will
increase its enterprise value by fifty percent but, if unsuccessful,
will reduce it by forty percent, causing insolvency. Assume equal
chances of success and failure. Ex ante, this business gamble in-
creases enterprise value, yet it exposes creditors to significant risk
solely for the benefit of shareholders. Enterprise value by itself is,
therefore, an inadequate test. It works only if directors can settle
on a fixed amount, like the fixed settlement in Chancellor Allen's
example. It does not work in the real world where directors decide
on a course of action that itself may have inherent risk that credi-
tors bear entirely.
Now analyze these gambles under the balancing approach sug-
gested by this Article. Both gambles create a reasonable expecta-
tion of insolvency. The corporation's directors, therefore, would
have a dual fiduciary obligation to creditors and shareholders, and
would be obligated to act in good faith to try to balance the rights
of those parties. Under that balancing, the double-or-nothing gam-
ble would appear to go too far in favoring shareholders over credi-
tors, and directors would presumably decide against it.
The second gamble, however, appears more difficult to ana-
lyze under the balancing test. If the balance were determined by a
corporation's stock or debt (see Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 363-64), are personally conflicted
and therefore cannot rely on the business judgment rule, Case proposes, and the author
agrees, that a committee of disinterested directors could rely on the business judgment rule
in approving the board's decision. Case, supra note 113, at 328.
120 The "double-or-nothing gamble" was suggested by Professor Ronald Gilson of Co-
lumbia Law School.
121 Of course, the gamble as stated is so blatant that it may violate the "smell test." The
author also observes, in Chancellor Allen's favor, that footnote 55 in the Credit Lyonnais
case may have implicitly assumed that creditors under any settlement would be paid in full.
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simple arithmetic comparison of benefit to shareholders with harm
to creditors, it would favor the shareholders. Yet that still allows
creditors to be exposed to significant risk solely for the benefit of
shareholders. The fallacy, of course, is that balancing benefit to
shareholders with harm to creditors is like balancing "apples and
oranges"-they are not comparable commodities.
There are at least two possible solutions. The first is to modify
the balancing test to require more, such as a determination
whether the gamble itself has a valid business purpose. Although
this approach might eliminate gambles that are purely speculative,
it would not resolve the underlying dilemma. One could addition-
ally require that if there were a valid business purpose, the direc-
tors still would have to consider less harmful ways to accomplish
the business objective. That inquiry, however, appears too open-
ended and procedurally burdensome as a basis for directors to
make decisions.122
A second possible solution, and the one adopted by this Arti-
cle, is to more directly address the non-comparable nature of the
commodities being balanced. In applying the balancing test, direc-
tors should have latitude to make their own good faith weighing of
benefit and harm, recognizing that harm to creditors may well be
more significant than benefit to shareholders. 123
Some guidance can be gained by comparing the somewhat
analogous dilemma that arises under "substantive consolidation"
law in bankruptcy. Although the analogy is imprecise, it provides a
122 Cf. Mitchell, supra note 16, at 1210-28. In the context of arguing that a corporation
has fiduciary obligations to public bondholders-a position this article does not adopt-
Mitchell proposes a
test [that] would proceed through several stages of inquiry [in applying those
obligations]. The first question, as to which the bondholders bear the burden of
proof, is whether actions taken by the corporation are inconsistent with their
reasonable expectations. Assuming that they sustain this burden, the next in-
quiry, as to which the burden of proof would be on the directors, would be
whether the directors had a legitimate business purpose in causing the corpora-
tion to act as it did. If the directors demonstrate a legitimate business purpose,
the bondholders would have the opportunity to demonstrate that other reason-
able means of accomplishing that purpose were available to the board that
would have been less harmful to the bondholders.
id. at 1224. Although this test is thoughtful, it appears more suited as a litigation inquiry
than as guidance by which directors can make decisions.
123 Creditors have legally enforceable claims for payments. Shareholders have only ex-
pectations. The law generally favors existing rights over potential rights. By way of com-
parison, the Fifth Amendment "takings" jurisprudence does not recognize speculative
property interests. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894-95
nn.7-8 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984); cf. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (denying land
speculators the right to windfalls from state contracts).
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useful perspective for gaining insight into the tension between bal-
ancing benefit to a corporate enterprise with harm to its credi-
tors.124  Substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy in
bankruptcy law that
involves the pooling of the assets and liabilities of two or more
related entities; the liabilities of the entities involved are then
satisfied from the common pool of assets created by consolida-
tion....
Because the entities to be consolidated are likely to have
different debt-to-asset ratios, consolidation "almost invariably
redistributes wealth among the creditors of the various
entities.' 112 5
Substantive consolidation applies a balancing test that also
grapples with the dilemma of comparing apples and oranges:
whether the "consolidation yields benefits offsetting the harm it in-
flicts on objecting parties. 1 12 6 To resolve this dilemma, "the court
may order consolidation only if it determines that the demon-
strated benefits of consolidation 'heavily' outweigh the harm. 12 7
This Article does not necessarily propose that substantive con-
solidation's "heavily outweigh" test is the appropriate standard for
corporate directors to use in balancing benefit to shareholders with
harm to creditors. However, that test suggests that where non-
124 Although an analogy cannot substitute for analysis, it nonetheless can provide "a
point of view from which to look and compare, a starting-point for genuine investigation."
ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox: AN ESSAY ON ToLsToy's VIEW OF His-
TORY 4 (Elephant Paperback 1993) (1953). Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW
(1995). "[Although] analogy gets us only to the threshhold of analysis," id. at 521,
"[m]etaphor plays a useful cognitive role in jolting a person out of his existing frame of
reference by getting him to look at something in a fresh, and perhaps more illuminating,
way," id. at 523; see also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 890 ("Metaphor, when effectively used, is a powerful rhe-
torical device because it engages the reader's attention and imagination in ways that more
literal uses of language do not.").
125 Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 248 (11th Cir.
1991) (citation omitted); see also Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan E. Rothman, Civil Forfeiture:
A Higher Form of Commercial Law?, 62 FORD. L. REV. 287, 309-13 (1993) (discussing how
insolvency resulting from substantive consolidation can harm creditors).
126 In re Auto-Train Corp., Inc., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Accord Eastgroup
Properties, 935 F.2d at 249. Its non-comparable commodities include the benefit to credi-
tors of an insolvent company seeking consolidation, id. at 251, and the benefit of
"avoid[ing] the expense or difficulty of sorting out the debtor's records to determine the
separate assets and liabilities of each affiliated entity," Auto-Train Corp., Inc., 810 F.2d at
276, as compared to "the harm it inflicts on objecting creditors," id.
127 Auto-Train Corp., Inc., 810 F.2d at 276. Accord Eastgroup Properties, 935 F.2d at
249. Compare these cases with the more stringent test of In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.,
Ltd., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying consolidation where one creditor would suffer
unfairly).
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comparable commodities of benefit and harm to different parties
are being weighed, the benefit may have to considerably outweigh
the harm, or at least provide a compelling case, to be justified. This
Article opens a dialogue on what the appropriate standard should
be.128
How, then, would the balancing test apply to the second gam-
ble-the action that, if successful, would increase enterprise value
by fifty percent but, if unsuccessful, would reduce it by forty per-
cent, causing insolvency, with equal chances of success and fail-
ure.129 In considering this gamble, directors may well conclude that
the benefit to shareholders does not sufficiently outweigh the risk
to creditors. The actual determination will depend on the particu-
lar facts130 as well as the standard ultimately adopted for the bal-
ancing. The point, however, is that, unlike Chancellor Allen's
enterprise value test under which this gamble would be acceptable,
it is by no means obvious that the gamble is compelling, and there-
fore acceptable, under the balancing test.
This Article, therefore, suggests an approach to the vicinity of
insolvency conundrum that sets a brighter line than Chancellor Al-
len's. approach to determine when directors have loyalty to credi-
tors as well as shareholders, but gives more leeway and discretion
to directors when that dual loyalty arises. Part III shows that this
approach can be applied without limiting a corporation's ability to
take normal business risks.
C. Unified Theory
The following unified theory of a corporation's obligations to
creditors therefore derives from part II:
1. A corporate debtor is bound according to its explicit
contractual obligations, including covenants.
2. A corporate debtor also has a commercial law obligation
of good faith to not act opportunistically in circumstances that
could not have been contemplated in advance, and to abide by
implicit rules of conduct that arise from widespread courses of
dealing in its industry or from particular courses of dealing be-
tween the corporation and its creditors.
128 Other possible standards might be that benefits "manifestly" or "demonstrably" out-
weigh the harm, or merely that the balance presents a compelling case.
129 See supra text accompanying note 121.
130 For example, if there is only a single class of debt, the terms of the debt might indi-
cate how much risk the creditors intended to assume. Holders of junk bonds bearing high
interest rates would have bargained for a high level of risk. In practice, however, it may be
difficult to assess creditor risk because most corporations have multiple classes of debt with
different rates and terms, as well as trade and involuntary debt.
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3. Fraudulent conveyance laws further restrict a debtor's
ability to transfer an asset or to incur an obligation when insol-
vent, or if the transfer or incurrence would make it insolvent, or
if the transfer is made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud its
creditors.
4. Directors of an insolvent corporation, or of a corpora-
tion whose actions have a reasonable expectation of resulting in
insolvency, have a fiduciary obligation to creditors as well as
shareholders. Directors then must scrutinize actions that in-
crease shareholder return by impairing creditor claims. The
more insolvent the corporation is or would become, the more
the fiduciary obligation shifts from shareholders to creditors, in
a continuum. In balancing this fiduciary obligation, directors
should have latitude to make their own good faith balancing of
benefit and harm, recognizing that harm to creditors may well
be more significant than benefit to shareholders; and therefore
the benefit might have to considerably outweigh the harm, or at
least provide a compelling case, to be justified. Nonetheless, di-
rectors would not need to assess intrinsic fairness. Further, the
business judgment rule would protect directors from being sec-
ond-guessed if they consider their dual fiduciary obligation in
good faith.
The application of this unified theory to actual corporate
transactions is discussed in part III of this Article.
III. APPLICATIONS
In this section, the unified theory will be applied to represen-
tative corporate transactions that enhance shareholder value but
thereby increase the riskiness of the corporation's debt.
A. Corporate "Splits"
In these transactions, a corporation whose business consists,
for example, of profitable and unprofitable product lines restruc-
tures by transferring the assets associated with the profitable prod-
uct line to a newly created affiliated corporation ("Newco").
Newco is owned by the same shareholders who own the original
corporation ("Oldco"), now shorn of the assets transferred to
Newco.13 ' The goal of this restructuring, or "corporate split," is to
create two corporations, with the original corporation, Oldco, hold-
ing the unprofitable product line, and the new corporation, Newco,
holding the profitable product line, in anticipation that the com-
131 This is normally accomplished by a stock split or dividend in which shareholders of
Oldco receive shares of Newco in an amount proportional to their holdings of Oldco stock.
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bined stock price of these corporations will exceed the stock price
of the original corporation. The stock market appears to recognize
this price increase,132 and therefore this Article assumes that it can
exist.
Corporate splits benefit shareholders, but can prejudice credi-
tors. The original corporation had assets of both product lines to
offset its debt. Newco now has assets of the profitable product line
but none of the debt. The debt remains with Oldco, which now
only owns assets of the unprofitable product line. Should a corpo-
ration be permitted to engage in a corporate split to benefit its
shareholders, even though it is detrimental to its creditors?
Assume there are. no contractual covenants prohibiting the
split. Also assume that the corporate split does not leave Oldco
insolvent, and is not intended to hinder, delay, or defraud its credi-
tors. If it did, the transfer of assets to Newco would be a fraudu-
lent conveyance, and therefore voidable under both federal and
state fraudulent transfer law.133
Even if Oldco is not left insolvent, certain of its creditors may
be prejudiced by the reduction in market value of debt securities
resulting from Oldco's diminished financial condition. However,
only creditors who customarily trade their claims are likely to be so
prejudiced, and these creditors are consensual and not involun-
tary.1 3 1 Private lenders, such as banks and insurance companies,
and investors in public bonds, choose to make their investments
knowing the risks and benefits and accepting higher interest rates
in return. 35 Non-consensual or involuntary creditors, such as tort
creditors, do not trade their claims because there is no market for,
or even custom of, trading involuntary claims. Indeed, it is often
132 See Hungry Shareholders vs. Wary Managers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995, at 1 (Bus.
Sec.). This price increase appears to reflect, from the standpoint of shareholders, a higher-
valued allocation of risk with assets. However, the shareholders gain at least partly at the
expense of creditors whose risk is increased, thereby creating the tension.
133 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994); U.F.T.A. § 7(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 660 (1985). As discussed
supra in part I.B, fraudulent transfer law prevents a debtor's transfer of assets for less than
reasonably equivalent value that leaves the debtor actually or constructively unable to pay
its creditors. In a corporate split, one would not even need to get to the question of corpo-
rate duty during actual or contingent insolvency.
134 In a debtor's bankruptcy, all of its claims can be traded. See Chaim J. Fortgang &
Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12
CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1990). But we are assuming that the corporate split does not result in
insolvency, much less bankruptcy.
135 Trade creditors are consensual and also know the risks. However, because their
claims are not usually traded, they are not generally prejudiced.
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illegal to trade such claims. 136 Therefore, the diminished financial
condition of the corporate debtor does not necessarily prejudice
involuntary creditors so long as the debtor remains solvent. 137 Fur-
thermore, fraudulent conveyance law, as well as the dual fiduciary
duty of directors in a contingent insolvency, limit corporate splits
that render the debtor insolvent.
Consensual creditors that wish to restrict corporate splits can
negotiate covenants, such as simple net worth tests or covenants
prohibiting the corporation from transferring a substantial part of
its assets. These covenants are common, in the author's experi-
ence, in bank and insurance company loan agreements. They are
uncommon, however, in public bond indentures, 38 and trade credi-
tors do not generally impose covenants. 139 The rationale for this
distinction is simple. Banks and insurance companies (collectively,
"institutional lenders") closely examine the credit of a corporate
borrower before making a loan. They therefore require tight cove-
nants to ensure that the borrower's financial condition does not
deteriorate during the term of the loan, and also require remedies,
such as the right to accelerate the debt, if the condition, as mea-
sured by the negotiated covenants, does deteriorate. The corpora-
tion, for its part, may be prepared to agree to restrictive covenants
136 In New York and many other states, it is often illegal to sell tort claims. See, e.g.,
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW. § 13-101 (McKinney 1989) (restricting sale of personal injury tort
claims).
137 This is, of course, somewhat of a simplification. A creditor of a highly solvent corpo-
ration is generally more likely than a creditor of a less solvent corporation to be repaid on
its debt at a future date. That is because the more highly solvent company can suffer more
losses and still be able to pay its debts. Indeed, it is rating agency and investor recognition
of this fact that leads to a downgrade in rating and a reduction in market value from a
corporate split. Nonetheless, creditors holding debt that has no expectation of being
traded do not suffer any loss if their debt is eventually repaid according to its terms. To
limit corporate risk taking in order to assure a creditor's eventual likelihood of repayment,
where the debtor is solvent and, therefore, presently capable of repaying its debts, would
appear to be unwise.
138 Public bond indentures almost never contain net worth covenants, and usually only
include restrictions on the transfer of "all or substantially all" of the corporation's assets.
However, in the author's experience, many of the riskier unrated "junk bonds" underwrit-
ten by Drexel Burnham Lambert contained net worth covenants that triggered a corporate
buy-back instead of an event of default. Unrated bonds issued in today's "high yield"
markets also contain protective covenants. That suggests that protective covenants indeed
may be necessary to induce investors to buy bonds of riskier corporations, and in that case
the market will find creative solutions.
139 Trade creditors do not impose covenants because they have no ability to monitor the
covenants. A trade creditor that is concerned about repayment will typically sell its goods
on a purchase money secured basis or on a C.O.D. (cash on delivery) or C.B.D. (cash
before delivery) basis. Involuntary creditors cannot impose covenants. This Article has
already shown that trade and involuntary creditors are owed no special obligation by a
corporation so long as it remains solvent. See also supra part I.D.
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if it cannot obtain a better deal elsewhere. It expects, however,
that the institutional lenders will consider waiving or amending the
covenant, sometimes for an increase in the lending rate, if the cor-
poration later makes such a request based on its business needs. 140
This type of bargain is more difficult to make with public
bondholders. Because the bonds can be freely traded, the identity
of the actual bondholders is sometimes difficult to establish on a
current basis. Even if bondholder identities could be determined,
the possibility of widespread ownership of the bonds may, as a
practical matter, make waivers and amendments harder to ob-
tain.1 41 Furthermore, a corporation soliciting waivers or amend-
ments from public bondholders would have to comply with the
federal securities law disclosure requirements,142 which can be ex-
pensive and time consuming. Corporations therefore often prefer,
and are willing to pay a higher rate of interest, 143 to issue public
debt with covenants that give some protection to bondholders but
still are flexible enough to allow the corporation to engage in any
business activity that may become desirable in the future.
The experience of public bond covenants after the Marriott
Split is particularly revealing. Investors in public bond issues be-
came sensitized to the so-called "event risk" of a corporate split,
and many indentures entered into shortly thereafter contained cov-
enants restricting such splits. 144 Soon, however, investors preferred
the higher rate offered by corporations in lieu of these cove-
nants,145 and, in the author's experience, these covenants are now
rarely seen in public debt indentures.
Public bondholders would not, merely by reason of their status
as public investors, obtain additional rights under the commercial
law duty of good faith. This Article has argued that whether or not
public bondholders have equal bargaining power with the corpo-
rate debtor-which they-do not146-they are not so clearly weaker
that commercial law should favor them.147 Public bondholders can
140 It is ironic that this same scenario occurred in Metropolitan Life.
141 Although bondholders can be widely distributed, large concentrations of bonds are
sometimes held by institutional investors, thereby making waivers and amendments easier
to obtain.
142 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1994).
143 See supra note 65.
144 See supra note 65.
145 See supra note 65.
146 Nonetheless, a bondholder has a form of bargaining power in deciding whether or
not to make the initial purchase of bonds. Anticipating that decision, investment bankers
negotiate terms that are expected to be sufficient to entice investors to buy the bonds.
147 See supra part I.D.
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choose whether to invest. As the Marriott lesson showed, they
weigh risk with rate of return in making their investment decisions.
The foregoing discussion assumed a market and investors who
are aware of the possibility of a corporate split. Would the analysis
change for the first corporate split, before which the market would
not reasonably expect such an action? This is a harder question
because it would require factual determinations under the com-
mercial law duty of good faith. The inquiry would focus on
whether the corporate split constituted opportunistic behavior that
could not have been contemplated in advance, or whether it vio-
lated implicit rules of conduct arising from a widespread course of
dealing in the industry. Consider this in the context of Marriott.
Because Marriott was the first corporate split, one might argue
that its public bondholders could not have contemplated that ac-
tion in advance when weighing risk with rate of return in making
their investment decision. One also might argue that the wide-
spread course of dealing of corporations issuing public debt in the
capital market is to transfer assets to affiliated companies only for
return consideration. A counter-argument, however, might be that
the corporate split is not really a transfer to an independent third
party but, effectively, a transfer to shareholders. Therefore, it is no
different from a creditor's standpoint than an ordinary dividend of
the assets to shareholders, an event that can be limited by a net
worth covenant. Which of these arguments would have succeeded
in the Marriott corporate split, or in other innovative corporate ac-
tions not yet contemplated, is a question of fact. 148 The essential
point, however, is that the actions would be subject to scrutiny
under the commercial law duty of good faith, without the need 149
to impose a traditional fiduciary standard.
B. Securitizations
In a securitization, a company (the "originator") can obtain
low cost, capital market financing by transferring its accounts re-
ceivable or other rights to payment ("receivables")
to a newly formed special purpose corporation, trust, or other
legally separate entity [the "SPV"]. The transfer is intended to
148 This Article does not purport to assess how prevalent in the marketplace an action
must be to change universal expectations, and whether it would make a difference if the
Marriott corporate split had been enjoined so as to cast doubt on the future use of that
technique.
149 Absent insolvency or contingent insolvency; see supra parts II.A-B.
[Vol. 17:647
1996] RETHINKING A CORPORATION'S OBLIGATIONS 683
separate the receivables from risks associated with the origina-
tor....
To raise funds to purchase these receivables, the SPV issues
securities in the capital markets. The SPV, however, must be
structured as "bankruptcy remote" to gain acceptance as an is-
suer of capital market securities.
To achieve bankruptcy remoteness, ...an SPV that is
owned or controlled by the originator is usually required to have
one or more independent directors. 5 °
The independent director requirement is intended to reduce
the chance that the SPV would file a voluntary bankruptcy petition
where the originator is bankrupt.' 5 ' "Such an independent director
theoretically would be less influenced by the originator and more
likely to consider his or her fiduciary obligations when required to
vote for or against the SPV's bankruptcy.' 1 52 The dilemma, of
course, is that if the SPV's directors have a fiduciary duty only to
shareholders, then the directors, including the independent direc-
tors, may well be obligated to cause the SPV to file a voluntary
bankruptcy petition in order to compromise the debt securities and
thereby maximize value to the originator-shareholder.
The unified theory presented by this Article offers some help
to resolve this dilemma. Although one could not contractually re-
strict the SPV from filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition, 53 and
fraudulent conveyance law would not apply because filing for
bankruptcy is neither an asset transfer nor incurrence of an obliga-
tion, 54 the obligations arising under commercial law and contin-
gent insolvency provide some guidance.
Under the commercial law duty of good faith, the SPV would
have an obligation to abide by implicit rules of conduct that arise
from particular courses of dealing between the corporation and its
creditors. In a securitization, the originator creates the SPV on the
premise, and discloses to the SPV's creditors to induce them to buy
the SPV's debt securities, that the SPV will be bankruptcy remote
and that the originator will take no steps to cause the SPV to file
for bankruptcy based on the originator's financial condition. Cred-
150 Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 135-36.
151 A debtor may file for voluntary, bankruptcy generally at its discretion. 11 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1994). A corporate SPV "normally would make this decision by a vote of its board
of directors." SCHWARCZ, supra note 4, at 16.
152 SCHWARCZ, supra note 4, at 17.
153 Such a restriction could be void. See supra note 4.
154 Because federal fraudulent conveyance law arises under federal bankruptcy law, it
would also be circular to use fraudulent conveyance law to prohibit a bankruptcy filing.
Furthermore, state fraudulent conveyance law could not preempt a federal bankruptcy
filing.
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itors invest based on the explicit understanding of bankruptcy re-
moteness between the SPV and the originator. They therefore
might argue that the commercial law duty of good faith requires
the SPV to abide by this course of dealing, so long as doing so
would not injure third parties. There is, nonetheless, an issue of
first impression whether the bankruptcy policy against restricting
voluntary petitions would limit the duty of good faith. 155
The obligation arising from contingent insolvency may provide
additional guidance. The SPV is a corporation whose proposed ac-
tion, filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition, could cause insol-
vency. 5 6 Directors of the SPV therefore should consider creditors
as well as shareholders when deciding whether the SPV should file
for voluntary bankruptcy. 5 7 The SPV's bankruptcy would signifi-
cantly impair its creditors by suspending their right to payment and
possibly compromising their claims. On the other hand, the origi-
nator as shareholder would still have its bargained-for equity in a
non-bankrupt SPV. 158  Because the benefit to shareholders does
not appear to outweigh the harm to creditors, directors are likely
to vote against a bankruptcy filing.' 59
The unified theory therefore helps to explain an SPV's bank-
ruptcy remoteness in securitization transactions.
155 A complete analysis of the bankruptcy policy against restricting voluntary petitions is
beyond the scope of this Article. The author notes, however, that bankruptcy courts have
recognized bad faith as a basis to dismiss a voluntary bankruptcy petition. See In re Camp-
bell, 124 B.R. 462, 464 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991). Bad faith means that the debtor has no
need for financial reorganization and has filed the petition solely to frustrate particular
creditors. In re Reiser Ford, Inc., 128 B.R. 234, 237-38 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991); In re
Southern Cal. Sound Sys., Inc., 69 B.R. 893, 899-900 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987). The author
assumes that the SPV involved in the securitization is solvent and not in need of financial
reorganization, and that the only reason for its filing bankruptcy would be to compromise
the claims of its creditors for the benefit of the originator.
156 See supra discussion of insolvency in notes 21 and 113. At least under Delaware
corporation law, "insolvency means insolvency in fact rather than insolvency due to a statu-
tory filing in defining [when] a fiduciary duty to creditors arises." Geyer v. Ingersoll Publi-
cations Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992). Nonetheless, "insolvency in fact" includes a
Delaware corporation being "unable to pay its debts as they fall due in the usual course of
business." Id. at 789. This definition would arguably include a federal bankruptcy filing
because the automatic stay suspends payment of any debts. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
157 This would not appear to violate bankruptcy policy. Directors are not restricted
from filing a voluntary petition, but are merely obligated to consider their fiduciary duty to
creditors as well as shareholders in making their decision.
158 This assumes that the SPV is realizing the value of its assets in the ordinary course of
its business, and a filing is not needed to avoid an asset foreclosure or otherwise protect the
SPV's equity.
159 Although directors would also be protected by the business judgment rule if they
decide in good faith to vote for bankruptcy.
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C. Leveraged Buyouts
In a leveraged buyout ("LBO"), a management group takes
control of a public corporation by causing the company to borrow
money and to use the proceeds to buy back its own outstanding
shares of stock.160 Shareholders benefit because they are bought
out at a premium. The corporation's creditors, however, are
prejudiced because the funds borrowed by the corporation to ac-
complish the LBO adds to the corporation's overall debt burden
without increasing its assets: "RJR Nabisco's actions [engaging in
an LBO] have drastically impaired the value of the bonds previ-
ously issued to plaintiffs by, in effect, misappropriating the value of
those bonds to help finance the LBO and to distribute an enor-
mous windfall to the company's shareholders."' 161 Does an LBO
violate a corporation's obligations to its creditors assuming that
contractual covenants are not breached?
In analyzing that question, we can assume that the LBO
neither leaves the corporation insolvent nor is intended to hinder,
delay, or defraud its creditors. This assumption is justified because
LBO lenders, to limit the risk of fraudulent conveyance, customa-
rily require opinions from independent valuation experts 162 dem-
onstrating that the corporation will be "solvent.' '1 63
As with corporate splits, only creditors who customarily trade
their claims-meaning only consensual and not involuntary credi-
tors164 --are likely to be prejudiced by an LBO if the corporation
remains solvent.165 However, consensual creditors chose to make
their investment knowing the risks and benefitting from higher in-
terest rates in return.166 They could have insisted on covenants
that would prohibit an LBO-such as a net worth or leverage test.
This Article has shown, however, that "most investors will continue
to go for the gold."'1 67 Furthermore, the experience of public bond
160 See David G. Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REv. 73 (1985).
More recently, management groups are assisted in the LBO by financial sponsors such as
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR).
161 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1506 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
162 One such expert is the firm of Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Inc.
163 This means that its assets will exceed its liabilities, it will be able to pay its debts as
they mature, and it will have an adequate capital for its business after giving effect to the
LBO.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
165 As discussed in note 137, supra, this is somewhat of a simplification.
166 See supra text accompanying note 135.
167 See Light, supra note 65, at 34.
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covenants after the Marriott Split 168 appears equally applicable to
LBO bond covenants.169
The Metropolitan Life v. RJR Nabisco case is particularly tell-
ing. Metropolitan Life originally held bonds that benefitted from
indenture covenants limiting an LBO.' 70 It chose, however, to
waive those covenants in return for better terms and an increased
interest rate on the bonds. 71 Only in retrospect, when RJR
Nabisco became the subject of an LBO, did Metropolitan Life
complain about its choice.
The unified theory of this Article therefore would not restrict
a corporation's decision to engage in an LBO.
D. Risky Business Ventures
Corporations, as businesses, must take risks in order to pros-
per. Sometimes these risks are significant, such as a corporation
entering into a new and untested product line which, if successful,
will be highly profitable but, if unsuccessful, could bankrupt the
company. These types of ventures can be like the double or noth-
ing gamble, discussed in part II.B, although they are usually not
nearly as blatant.
Risky business ventures therefore raise hard policy choices:
Should risk taking be encouraged where the success rate is low and
the venture is financed by creditors? Ventures that are unlikely 172
to cause a solvent corporation to become insolvent raise no fiduci-
ary obligation to creditors. 173 However, ventures that are likely, or
reasonably expected, to cause insolvency, or that are engaged in by
an insolvent corporation, raise the dual fiduciary obligation of di-
rectors discussed earlier. 74 Directors would then have to balance
the benefit to shareholders with the harm to creditors, and would
be protected by the business judgment rule if they act in good faith.
This Article has shown that the more insolvent the corpora-
tion is or would become, the more the fiduciary obligation shifts
from shareholders to creditors, in a continuum. In the context of a
risky business venture, this means that directors should give
168 See supra text accompanying note 144.
169 See Kahan, supra note 65, at 621-22.
170 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1511 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
171 Id.
172 Meaning that the venture is not reasonably expected to cause insolvency. See supra
note 114.
173 Assuming they are not prohibited by contractual covenant.
174 See supra part II.B.
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greater scrutiny, from the standpoint of creditors, to ventures that,
if unsuccessful, would significantly impair repayment of the debt as
opposed to those where the insolvency, if it occurred, would not
significantly impair repayment. 175 The author does not, however,
suggest that this shift can be quantified; directors should have lati-
tude to make their own good faith weighing of shareholder benefit
and creditor harm. For example, creditors should scrutinize ven-
tures such as the double-or-nothing gamble which, if unsuccessful,
would wipe out creditors. But ventures that, if unsuccessful, would
make the corporation insolvent by only $1 would merit little
scrutiny.
This can be further illustrated by recalling the hypothetical de-
scribed by Chancellor Allen in his footnote 55 to the Credit Lyon-
nais case. He posits a corporation whose sole asset is a judgment
on appeal having a 25% chance of affirmance, a 5% chance of re-
versal, and a 70% chance of modification to a lesser amount.
Either reversal or modification would leave the corporation insol-
vent. Because the 75% combined chance of reversal or modifica-
tion makes insolvency a reasonable expectation, the corporation's
directors would have a fiduciary obligation to creditors as well as
shareholders. 17 6
How, then, would a director fulfill his or her dual fiduciary
obligation? Reversal of the judgment, under Chancellor Allen's
hypothetical, would completely wipe out the corporation's $12 mil-
lion in bondholder claims. Modification would result in only a $4
million recovery for payment of those claims, still creating a signifi-
cant insolvency. Therefore, a director's duty to creditors should be
at the high end of the continuum.
175 Directors should weigh the probability of the venture failing with the consequences
of failure. For example, greater scrutiny should be given to a venture that has a 60%
chance of failing than one that has a 40% chance if both have the same consequences of
failure. However, little scrutiny needs to be given to a venture with a 60% chance of
failing if the failure would have only minimal consequences to creditors.
176 Because Chancellor Allen's hypothetical is pristine, only the fiduciary obligation of
directors is called into play. No contractual obligation would arise because there are no
apparent covenants restricting the corporation's conduct of the litigation. No fraudulent
conveyance would occur because none of the actions taken in the litigation would consti-
tute a transfer of property or the incurrence of an obligation. The commercial law obliga-
tion of good faith would not be breached because the corporation's creditors are not
inherently weaker parties, see supra text accompanying notes 54-83, and the litigation con-
stitutes neither opportunistic behavior that could not have been contemplated by the credi-
tors in advance nor a violation of implicit rules of conduct that arise from widespread
courses of industry dealing or from any apparent course of dealing between the corpora-
tion and its creditors.
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That does not, however, mean that directors are constrained to
settle the litigation at any price that avoids the risk of insolvency.177
Rather, in determining the litigation strategy, directors simply must
act in good faith to try to balance the relative interests of share-
holders and creditors, recognizing that harm to creditors may well
be more significant than benefit to shareholders. One therefore
would expect the directors to attempt to settle the litigation at an
amount that pays creditors but also achieves as high a recovery for
shareholders as can be reasonably negotiated. If negotiations
break down and the judgment is ultimately reversed or modified
on appeal, directors would be protected by the business judgment
rule if they acted in good faith.
It is also useful to consider variations on Chancellor Allen's
hypothetical. For example, if modification would result in a $13
million (as opposed to merely $4 million) recovery, only the 5%
chance of reversal would cause insolvency. Directors then may
fairly conclude that insolvency is not a reasonable expectation.
Their fiduciary obligation therefore would be solely to
shareholders.1 78
On the other hand, if modification would result in an $11.8
million recovery-more than the $4 million in the original hypo-
thetical but still not enough to pay the $12 million of bondholder
claims-there again would be a 75% Chance of insolvency. Direc-
tors therefore would have a dual fiduciary obligation to creditors
and shareholders. However, because the insolvency resulting from
modification would be slight (resulting in only a $200,000 loss on
$12 million of claims, or less than 2%), the directors' duty to credi-
tors would be at the low end of the continuum. Benefit to share-
holders may well outweigh the harm to creditors. Director loyalty
177 Nor does it mean, as Chancellor Allen suggested in his footnote 55, that directors
must settle at any price that preserves the corporation's ex ante value. See supra text ac-
companying note 107.
178 There is a minor discontinuity in this analysis that should be explained. The analysis
assumes that a dual fiduciary obligation would only arise where there is a reasonable ex-
pectation of insolvency. See supra text accompanying note 113. Therefore, in the hypo-
thetical above, no fiduciary obligation arises from only a 5% risk of insolvency, even
though the insolvency, if it occurred (caused by reversal of the judgment), would be cata-
strophic to creditors. This approach recognizes .that risk is present in any business transac-
tion and that it is unrealistic to burden directors with dual loyalties for events that are not
reasonably expected to occur.
Furthermore, actual transactions rarely yield precise probabilities like 5%. Directors
therefore would make judgment calls on whether or not there is a reasonable expectation
of insolvency, and again would be protected by the business judgment rule if they act in
good faith even though insolvency later occurs.
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would then be primarily to the shareholders to resist any settle-
ment that is not favorable to them.
It is also important to view risky business ventures in a practi-
cal context. Creditors take risks when they invest in a company.
The law cannot eliminate a business risk; it can only try to reach an
appropriate balance between competing rights. Furthermore, most
business ventures are not "bet the company" transactions. Usually,
the corporation is risking losses to generate substantially greater
profits if the venture is successful. Losses do not, however, make a
corporation insolvent unless they exceed its equity, and most busi-
ness ventures are not reasonably expected, even if unsuccessful, to
have that dramatically negative an impact on the corporation.
There are, of course, industries where bet the company trans-
actions are common. Small companies in fast moving markets,
such as high technology, often risk insolvency whenever they bring
out a new product whose cost is high in relation to the company's
capital. This Article does not suggest that directors of these com-
panies face threats of personal liability if they lose these bets. The
directors may well conclude 179 that there is a compelling case for
the product innovation, such as where failure to bring out the prod-
uct would result in the certain death of the company, innovation of
this type is customary in the company's industry, and creditors
know the riskiness of their debtor.180
This Article, therefore, does not suggest that risky business
ventures are inappropriate or violate corporate obligations to cred-
itors. It only suggests that directors should scrutinize them from
the standpoint of creditors as well as shareholders if the corpora-
tion is insolvent or if the venture would make it insolvent.
CONCLUSION
This Article has derived a unified theory of a corporate
debtor's obligation to creditors by examining the obligation of a
non-corporate debtor and then analyzing how the obligation is af-
fected when the debtor is a corporation. It has shown that a non-
corporate debtor not only has obligations under contract and
fraudulent conveyance law but also has a limited commercial law
obligation of good faith to creditors.
179 If the directors do so in good faith, they would be protected by the business judg-
ment rule. See supra part II.C.4.
180 Cf. supra note 135 and accompanying text. Involuntary creditors cannot always
know the risks. Assuming such creditors exist, their interests would be taken into account
as part of the overall balancing engaged in by the directors.
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These obligations apply equally to corporate and non-corpo-
rate debtors. The commercial law obligation of good faith obviates
the need to attempt to create a traditional fiduciary relationship
between a solvent corporate debtor and its creditors, which not
only would have little conceptual justification but also could impair
a corporation's risk taking ability which is essential to success in
business transactions.
This Article also has shown that directors of a corporation that
is insolvent, or whose action would have a reasonable expectation
of resulting in insolvency, have a fiduciary obligation to creditors as
well as to shareholders. Directors then must scrutinize actions that
increase shareholder return by impairing creditor claims. The
more insolvent the corporation is or would become, the more the
fiduciary obligation shifts from shareholders to creditors, in a con-
tinuum. In balancing this fiduciary obligation, directors should
have latitude to make their own good faith weighing of benefit and
harm, recognizing that harm to creditors may well be more signifi-
cant than benefit to shareholders; and therefore the benefit may
have to considerably outweigh the harm, or at least provide a com-
pelling case, to be justified. Nonetheless, directors generally
should be able to rely on the business judgment rule in balancing
their dual obligations without needing to assess intrinsic fairness.
The unified theory proposed in this Article therefore balances
a corporation's ability to take legitimate business risks with the
reasonable expectations of creditors that their rights will not be
impaired. The theory does not require implementing legislation or
changes in case law. We need only to visualize the theory in the
law that lies before us.
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